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ESSAY
THE FIRST YEAR: THE ROLE OF A MODERN
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Kathryn Judge*
Insufficient liquidity can trigger fire sales and wreak havoc on a
financial system. To address these challenges, the Federal Reserve (the
Fed) and other central banks have long had the authority to provide
financial institutions liquidity when market-based sources run dry. Yet,
liquidity injections sometimes fail to quell market dysfunction. When
liquidity shortages persist, they are often symptoms of deeper problems
plaguing the financial system. This Essay shows that continually
pumping new liquidity into a financial system in the midst of a persis-
tent liquidity shortage may increase the fragility of the system and, on
its own, is unlikely to resolve the deeper problems causing those liquidity
shortages to persist.
This Essay suggests that when facing persistent liquidity shortages,
the Fed should instead use the leverage it enjoys by virtue of controlling
access to liquidity to improve its understanding of the ailments causing
the market dysfunction to persist and to help address those underlying
issues. When liquidity shortages persist, they will often indicate that
market participants lack critical information about risk exposures or
that they are concerned financial institutions or other entities lack suffi-
cient capital in light of the risks to which they are exposed. Providing
credible information and working with other policymakers to ensure the
overall financial system is sufficiently capitalized are thus among the
issues that the Fed should prioritize when facing persistent liquidity
shortages. This Essay thus provides a new paradigm for how the Fed
can utilize its lender-oflast-resort authority to prevent a nascent finan-
cial crisis from erupting into one that inflicts significant harm on the
real economy.
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The heart of this Essay brings these dynamics to life through a
close examination of the Fed's actions during the early stages of the
2007-2009 financial crisis (the Crisis). Using transcripts from Fed
meetings and other primary materials, this Essay reconstructs the first
thirteen months of the Crisis. The analysis reveals more than a year
during which Fed officials could have taken an array of actions that
may have reduced the size of the Great Recession and the amount of
credit risk and moral hazard stemming from the government's sub-
sequent interventions. The analysis also demonstrates specific ways that
the Fed's lender-of-last-resort authority could serve as the type of respon-
sive and dynamic regulatory tool that the Fed requires when seeking to
restore stability during the early phases of a panic.
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INTRODUCTION
Dynamism is a central challenge for regulation today.' Nowhere is
this challenge more acute than in financial regulation, where the very act
of regulating causes activity to move to less regulated spaces. 2 And at no
time is the problem more pressing than in the midst of a financial crisis,
which often emanates from fragilities in those less regulated domains.3
This Essay reveals that the Federal Reserve (the Fed) need not wait for
Congress to expand its oversight authority to tackle these challenges
right at their source. It can instead use the leverage it enjoys by virtue of
controlling access to liquidity to obtain critical information about the
challenges it is facing and to start addressing those challenges. This Essay
thus sheds critical new light on how a central bank can best use its
1. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism
in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53, 78 (2011) (identifying "continuous change
and variation ... as the most pervasive challenge of current public problems").
2. See, e.g., Paul Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking:
Principles and Reconstruction, in Bank for Int'l Settlements, BIS Papers No. 79: Re-Thinking
the Lender of Last Resort 10, 17 (2014), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap79.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining "regulatory arbitrage is endemic" to modem
finance).
3. See, e.g., Robert F. Bruner & Sean D. Carr, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned
from the Market's Perfect Storm 65-70 (2007) (explaining financial crisis of 1907 emanated
from trust companies engaged in activities similar to those of banks but subject to different
public and private regulatory regimes); see also infra Part III (showing central role of shadow
banking system in Crisis).
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lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) authority to contain a growing financial
crisis.
This Essay advances the LOLR literature by showing that the optimal
role for a LOLR to play depends on the type of liquidity shortage it is
facing. Some liquidity shortages are caused by an exogenous event, like
the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The current LOLR literature accurately cap-
tures the ways that such shocks can trigger a dangerous cycle of liquidity
shortages and fire sales that harm the financial system.' Under these
circumstances, the standard prescription that a LOLR should flood the
market with liquidity, subject only to moral hazard and credit risk con-
siderations, is apt.5 When the cause of the problem is exogenous to the
system, liquidity alone will often suffice to restore market functioning
and the shortages will be finite.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis (the Crisis), however, and other
periods of financial distress have a very different arc. During these
episodes, liquidity shortages persist despite countervailing efforts by a
LOLR to address them. Persistent liquidity shortages pose a very different
challenge and, in a modern financial system, convey distinct and impor-
tant information. In today's more complete markets, which include a
robust interbank lending market and a developed regime for sale and
repurchase agreements (repos), a financial institution that is healthy or
in possession of high-quality collateral should be able to access liquidity
from market-based sources. Thus, when liquidity shortages persist in the
face of aggressive efforts by a central bank to address them, those
shortages are not just potential aggravators of systemic distress, they are
also symptoms signaling the existence of deeper problems plaguing the
financial system. Continuing to pump liquidity into the market during
such periods functions as a palliative: It may temporarily reduce the pain,
but it will not rectify the underlying problems-and it may even make
things worse by allowing those problems to fester.
Fortunately, in conjunction with posing distinct challenges, persistent
liquidity shortages also pose distinct opportunities. The untapped
potential of the Fed's LOLR authority arises from the fact that during
periods of systemic distress, liquidity will tend to be scarce and, hence,
valuable. Controlling access to liquidity is thus a tool that becomes more
potent in precisely the circumstances the Fed needs it most. Just as impor-
tantly, the liquidity shortages will often serve as a roadmap to the under-
lying challenges plaguing the financial system, as lack of liquidity in a
domain where liquidity previously was plentiful is often an indication of
4. See infra Part I (explaining how current literature focuses on reasons for bank
runs and ways in which LOLR can stem such runs).
5. See infra section I.A.
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where the deeper problems lie.6 This Essay shows how the Fed can more
effectively use its LOLR authority to promote systemic stability-the
mandate that justified giving this authority to the Fed when it was
founded in 1913 and that continues tojustify the Fed's role in today's far
more complex financial system. The focus is on information.
The claim is simple: The Fed should use its LOLR authority to
obtain critical information about the underlying issues that are causing
the market dysfunction to persist. When it appears that market
participants are hesitant to work with one another because of a lack of
information, the Fed should also play a role in helping to overcome the
frictions impeding the creation and redistribution of critical information.
And when it appears that market participants are pulling back because of
legitimate concerns about the financial health of other financial insti-
tutions, the Fed should use its authority and work with other regulators
and Congress, as needed, to help ensure that financial institutions are
adequately capitalized in light of the risks to which they are exposed. In
short, the Fed should more fully embrace the role it has often, albeit
inconsistently, played as an "information-coordination agent" during
periods of systemic financial distress.7
The revised paradigm proposed here, while consistent with aspects
of how the Fed has often used its formal and informal authority in the
past, marks an important shift in the theory of how a LOLR should
respond to systemic distress. The current paradigm, invoked repeatedly by
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke in explaining how the Fed used its authority
during the Crisis and by outside courts and commentators assessing the
Fed's actions, comes from a nineteenth-century British commentator.'
That paradigm is focused, almost exclusively, on addressing the ways that
insufficient liquidity can aggravate systemic distress. This Essay, by contrast,
builds on the insight that when liquidity remains in short supply despite
aggressive efforts by the Fed to provide fresh liquidity to the financial
6. See infra Part IV (identifying specific ways in which events during early stages of
Crisis alerted Fed officials to particular information gaps contributing to market
dysfunction).
7. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (examining Fed's historical
willingness to act as information-coordination agent).
8. See infra notes 19-26, 57 and accompanying text (describing Bagehot's dictum and
its use by Fed policymakers to explain Fed's actions); see also Kathryn Judge, A Different
Take on the AIG Case: The Dangers of Invoking 19th Century Principles to Solve 21st
Century Problems, CLS Blue Sky Blog (June 23, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2015/06/23/anther-take-n-aig-the-dangers-f-invking-19thcentury-principles-t-solve-
21st-century-problems [http://perma.cc/B2ED-9BUD] ("Ben Bernanke and other leading
policymakers regularly invoked Bagehot's dictum to defend their actions during the recent
financial crisis, and outside experts similarly invoked Bagehot to assess the appropriateness
of those actions.").
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system, deeper problems are causing those liquidity shortages to persist.9
Following the established paradigm without seeking to understand and
address those underlying issues will only make the system more fragile
and increase the ultimate size and scope of the crisis to come. When
facing persistent systemic distress, the Fed should accordingly change
course. Rather than just using its LOLR authority to help contain the dis-
tress that can arise from insufficient liquidity, the Fed should also use its
LOLR authority to serve as an information-coordination agent-facili-
tating the collection and production of the information required to
understand why liquidity shortages are persisting. Only by gathering such
information and helping to disseminate critical information to market
participants, other regulators, and Congress, can the Fed best fulfill its
role of helping to contain a growing financial crisis.
Recognizing that these concepts are best demonstrated through
example, the heart of this Essay is a detailed examination of the first year
of the Crisis. This case study illuminates the central role that infor-
mational challenges played in inhibiting market functioning during the
Crisis and the ways that informational challenges limited the capacity of
Fed and other policymakers to understand the nature and scope of the
problems plaguing the financial system. The examination also establishes
that-contrary to a common assumption that the Crisis began in
September 2008," when Lehman Brothers failed and the Crisis
exploded-the Crisis actually began thirteen months earlier, in August
2007.11
Although largely overlooked in the extensive literature on the Crisis,
this interim period is the critical juncture when trying to assess whether
the Fed and other policymakers could have done more to prevent the
ultimate fallout that made the Crisis the Crisis. Before August 2007,
markets appeared to be stable and well functioning, making it nearly
impossible for policymakers to appreciate just how fragile the financial
system had become. 12 By September 2008, the Fed and other policy-
9. See infra section II.C.2 (suggesting when market participants lack critical infor-
mation on creditworthiness of counterparties and value of collateral, they will be hesitant
to trade and liquidity shortages are likely to persist).
10. See infra notes 314-316 (interrogating assumption that, prior to September 2008,
incipient Crisis was too amorphous and ill defined to motivate congressional action).
11. See infra note 137 (collecting sources pinpointing August 2007 as start of Crisis).
12. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don't See
Them Coming 4 (2012) (stating prior to Crisis, economists "had the view that a crisis could not
occur in the United States, that the problem had been solved"); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Meeting of the Eastern Economic
Association: The Great Moderation (Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
Boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040220/ [http://perma.cc/E443-5ZVH] (noting "[o]ne of the
most striking features of the economic landscape over the past twenty years or so has been a
substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility" and describing various explanations for the
"Great Moderation").
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makers had no attractive options.'" As reflected in the massive ripples
emanating from Lehman's bankruptcy, allowing systemically significant
institutions to fail crippled market functioning, leading to severe and
adverse spillover effects on the real economy. Yet the only alternative
available given the government's relative lack of information-bailing
out institutions like AIG-gave rise to massive moral hazard and exposed
the government to credit risk.'4 As the only period during which policy-
makers had been alerted to the systemic risk that had built up in the
financial system and had time to take actions that could have altered the
course ahead, the first year of the Crisis had the potential to be pivotal.
Working closely with primary materials, including meeting tran-
scripts of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), a core decision-
making body of the Fed, this Essay reexamines the decisions that Fed
policymakers made and could have made during this critical period. The
analysis shows that the Fed is already putting itself at the forefront of
crisis containment efforts and that using its LOLR authority in the way
proposed is consistent, in spirit, with the Fed's established approach of
taking the lead in doing whatever is necessary to help contain a looming
financial crisis. At the same time, the analysis also reveals numerous junc-
tures at which Fed policymakers might well have made different, and
better, decisions had the Fed and other policymakers embraced the view
that the Fed should use its LOLR authority in the ways here proposed.
15
The purpose of this analysis is not to fault Fed policymakers, but to under-
stand and alter the forces inhibiting their willingness to use the Fed's
LOLR authority in the manner most likely to successfully contain a
financial crisis once underway.
This Essay proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the rationales for
having a LOLR and how the Fed used its LOLR authority during the
Crisis. Part II presents the Essay's claim-that a central bank facing
persistent liquidity shortages should use its LOLR authority to under-
stand and help coordinate a response to the ailments giving rise to those
13. The Federal Reserve System consists of the seven-member Board of Governors
(the Board), twelve regional banks that function as the operating arm of the system, and
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of all members of the Board
and five regional bank presidents. See Richard S. Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
R. Miller, The Law of Financial Institutions 61 (5th ed. 2013). This Essay specifies among
these bodies when appropriate, but, given the high degree of overlap and common
purpose, it often focuses on the Fed without specifying a particular body within it.
14. For further discussion of the costs of these two events, see infra section III.D.
Typically, the parties that most benefit when an institution is bailed out are the
institution's creditors. This leads to an array of market distortions. Perceptions that an
institution is too big (or otherwise systemically significant or politically connected) to fail
alter creditors' analyses, increasing their willingness to extend credit and causing them to
do so on excessively favorable terms. This distorts competition, incents institutions to grow
or otherwise alter their risk profiles in ways that increase expectations they will receive a
bailout, and facilitates excessive risk taking.
15. See infra Part IV.
2016] 849
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shortages. The focus is on information. Part III reconstructs the critical
first year of the Crisis. Using transcripts of meetings of the FOMC, auto-
biographies of leading policymakers, a detailed report prepared in con-
junction with the Lehman bankruptcy, and other sources, it shows what
policymakers knew and believed throughout the relevant period. Part IV
considers how the Crisis may have played out differently had the Fed used
its LOLR authority in the manner here proposed. Part V examines
drawbacks to the proposed approach. Lack of liquidity remains an ag-
gravator of systemic distress and expanding the aims that liquidity facilities
are designed to serve may increase concerns about stigma, create opera-
tional challenges, or otherwise reduce the provision of liquidity. The
analysis nonetheless suggests that most of these issues could be managed,
and it sheds light on how a central bank might operationalize the
proposed approach.
I. LENDER OF LAST RESORT
In the United States and most other jurisdictions, the central bank
functions as the LOLR. This means that the Fed has the authority to
provide collateralized loans to banks'6 and, in "unusual and exigent
circumstances," to nonbanks. 7 The role of a LOLR is to provide the
liquidity banks and other institutions need to avoid fire sales and satisfy
short-term creditors when market-based sources of liquidity are scarce. 18
Banks and other financial institutions secure these loans by posting less
liquid assets as collateral. This Part examines the reasons for having a
central bank that can serve as a LOLR during periods of systemic distress
and how those rationales have evolved over time. It then provides a quick
summary of the Fed's LOLR activities during the Crisis and how the
established-but-outdated paradigm of how a LOLR should respond to
systemic distress appears to have shaped the Fed's actions and third-party
assessments of the same.
A. Background: Evolving Rationales
The notion that a central bank should function as the LOLR goes
back at least to 1802 and the work of Henry Thornton. 9 Yet today, the
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a) (2012) ("Any Federal Reserve bank... may make
advances to any member bank . .
17. Id. § 343(3) (A).
18. See, e.g., Thomas M. Humphrey, The Classical Concept of the Lender of Last
Resort, Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond Econ. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 7,
https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/econo
mic_review/1975/pdf/er6lOlOl.pdf [http://perma.cc/AMB2-6K94] ("The objective of
the central bank in time of panic is to satisfy the market's demand for liquidity.").
19. See, e.g., Thomas M. Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort: The Concept in
History, Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond Econ. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 8, 8-12
[hereinafter Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort], https://www.richmondfed.org/-
/media/ richmondfedorg/ publications/research/ economicreview/ 1989/pdf/er75020
850 [Vol. 116:843
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origins of the concept are typically associated with the 1873 publication
of Lombard Street, a still-influential text in which Walter Bagehot argued
that the Bank of England was right to extend loans to any party with
appropriate collateral during times of systemic distress, subject to certain
conditions designed to address the corresponding moral hazard. 20 As
Bagehot explained, in the face of a crisis, injecting additional liquidity
into the financial system in this fashion could not guarantee a good
outcome, but failure to do so would guarantee a bad one. 2' His pre-
scription, embodied in a series of guidelines known today as Bagehot's
dictum, was that a central bank should lend freely during a crisis, subject
to constraints designed to reduce the inevitable moral hazard and credit
risk. 2
2
At the time Thornton and Bagehot were writing, and even at the
Fed's founding, LOLR activity was the primary mechanism through
which a central bank could affect overall monetary supply.23 A central
rationale underlying their analyses thus related to the need to maintain
the money stock.2 4 Since the 1930s, however, LOLR operations have
played only a modest role in this regard.25 Open market operations
(OMO), through which the Fed alters the level of reserves in the
financial system by buying, selling, borrowing, and lending Treasury
2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9F2B-G5A7] (explaining Henry Thornton "identified the Bank
of England's distinguishing characteristics as an L[O]LR," "specified the L[O]LR's
primary function," and "distinguished between the micro and macroeconomic aspects
of this function," among other contributions).
20. See Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street A Description of the Money Market 196-99 (1873)
(arguing "in time of panic [the central bank] must advance freely and vigorously" while
keeping interest rates high as deterrent against idle borrowing); Peter Conti-Brown, Misreading
Walter Bagehot: What Lombard Street Really Means for Central Banking, The New Rambler
(Dec. 14, 2015) (reviewing Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money
Market (1873)), http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/economics/misreading-walter-
bagehot-what-lombard-street-really-means-for-central-banking [http://penna.cc/S54X-FP9Q]
(identifying account that "Bagehot became the first to articulate what a central bank should do
to prevent a panic from becoming a crisis" as "common trope").
21. See Bagehot, supra note 20, at 198-99. In this sense, he was more prescient than
many economists writing in his wake.
22. See id. at 197-99 ("[A]dvances should be made on all good banking securities,
and as largely as the public ask for them.").
23. See, e.g., George G. Kaufman, Lender of Last Resort: A Contemporary
Perspective, in Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort 169, 182-83
(Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds., 2002) ("In the early days.... analysts gave heavy
weight injustifying L[O]LR intervention to the protection of the money supply.").
24. See Humphrey, Lender of Last Resort, supra note 19, at 16 ("Thornton and
Bagehot believed the L[O]LR had the duty ... to protect the money stock ....").
25. See Kaufman, supra note 23, at 180 ("As financial markets developed in breadth
and resiliency.... market operations preempt[ed] the discount window as the major tool
of monetary policy .. ").
2016]
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securities, have largely superseded discounting as the primary mecha-
nism through which the Fed implements monetary policy.26
This has led to a second generation of scholarship that premised the
need for a LOLR on the inherent instability of banks and the adverse
consequences of fire sales.27 Two defining characteristics of banks are
their use of fractional reserves and their role in maturity transforma-
tion.28 Much of a bank's funding takes the form of short-term liabilities,
like demand deposits, while most of its assets are long term and relatively
illiquid, like loans to businesses and individuals. 29 This works most of the
time, as the bank retains sufficient liquid assets to meet typical depositor
demands.30 The system breaks down, however, when depositor demands
become correlated, as they do during a bank run.3 Once a bank depletes
its liquid reserves, it must sell illiquid assets to obtain the cash needed to
pay off other depositors.32 The illiquid nature of the assets and the need
to sell them in a very short timeframe leads to "fire sales," at prices well
below the best value price of the assets sold, 3  a process that could cause
26. See, e.g., Xavier Freixas et al., The Lender of Last Resort: A Twenty-First Century
Approach, 2 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 1085, 1086 (2004) (noting "Bagehot view of the LOLR is
often seen as obsolete for any well-developed financial system"); see generally Perry
Mehrling, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort
(2010) (providing thorough historical overview of this evolution).
27. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 23, at 182 (explaining how "[p]rotection of
macro-liquidity has shifted from protection of the aggregate money supply to protection of
equilibrium asset prices," and assuming, in both instances, the thing from which the
system needs protection is a "sudden adverse shock[] that cause[s] markets to temporarily
overadjust" (emphasis added)); Tucker, supra note 2, at 15 (explaining by "providing
liquidity" when banks face runs by short-term creditors, "the central bank reduces the
need for a forced sale of assets that otherwise would depress values, causing avoidable
insolvencies and knocking the economy as a whole onto an inferior equilibrium growth
path").
28. Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 40, 45.
29. Id. at 45-49.
30. Id.
31. See Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability
of Bank Runs, 60J. Fin. 1293, 1293 (2005) (explaining "[t]he maturity mismatch between
assets and liabilities makes banks inherently unstable by exposing them to the possibility of
panic-based bank runs ... when investors rush to withdraw their deposits" because they
know every bank lacks sufficient short-tern, liquid assets to pay off all depositors).
32. See id. at 1293-94 (observing that "[als a result [of a run], the bank is forced to
liquidate its long-term investments at a loss" and may fail).
33. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and
Macroeconomics, 25 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 30 (2011) (defining fire sales as "forced in the
sense that the seller cannot pay creditors without selling assets" and explaining "price is
dislocated because the highest potential bidders are typically... themselves indebted and
cannot borrow more to buy the asset" (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny,
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1343,
1346-47 (1992))).
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even a healthy bank to wind up insolvent.34 This can give rise to a range
of ripple effects, in part because other banks holding similar assets may
be forced to write them down, causing losses to spread and threatening
the stability of other institutions.
35
The presence of a LOLR disrupts this vicious circle. Rather than
selling illiquid assets, a bank facing a run can now use those assets as
collateral for a loan from the central bank and thus obtain the liquidity
needed to satisfy depositor demands. 36 Moreover, the mere presence of a
LOLR can reduce the tendency of depositors to run, as they now have no
reason to fear that an otherwise healthy bank might be rendered insol-
vent should other depositors demand their money back.
3 1
The dramatic changes in the financial markets over the past thirty
years have complicated even this updated depiction of the LOLR's func-
tion. One reason is that market and regulatory innovations have cast
doubt on whether the Fed should continue to provide LOLR support to
individual institutions. There is now a robust interbank lending market
and other financial innovations, like repos, which typically enable banks
with appropriate collateral to quickly and cheaply obtain new funding.
3 8
34. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 402 (1984) (demonstrating why "even 'healthy' banks can
fail" when facing a run and why it can be rational for depositors to run on healthy banks).
35. See, e.g., Eduardo Dtvila, Dissecting Fire Sales Externalities 10-12 (May 2014)
(unpublished working paper) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining
"collateral externality" created by fire sales "arises because experts do not internalize that
selling an additional unit of capital depresses the equilibrium price and, consequently,
reduces the borrowing capacity of other constrained experts"); Jeremy C. Stein, Governor,
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Fire-Sales Problem and Securities Financing
Transactions 3-4 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
stein20131004a.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HTS-JS6W] (describing harm fire sales inflict
upon third parties as decreases in collateral value of security exacerbate financing
constraints); see also Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity
and Funding Liquidity, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2201, 2205 (2009) (showing how funding
liquidity and market liquidity shortages can reinforce and aggravate one another).
36. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 15 ("[Bjy providing liquidity the central bank
reduces the need for a forced sale of assets that otherwise would depress values .. ").
37. E.g., id. at 15 ("Ex ante, knowing that the LOLR is there, banks' short-term
creditors should be less inclined to run."); see also Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 34, at
404, 416-18 (suggesting existence of deposit insurance prevents runs and further positing
LOLR presence can serve similar role).
38. See, e.g., Gara Afonso et al., Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the
Financial Crisis, 66 J. Fin. 1109, 1113 (2011) ("A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a
financial contract that allows the use of a security as collateral for a cash loan, mostly on an
overnight basis .... The repo market is a large and opaque over-the-counter market that
exceeded $10 trillion in the United States in 2008."); Viktoria Baklanova, Adam Copeland &
Rebecca McCaughrin, Reference Guide to U.S. Repo and Securities Lending Markets 4-21
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 740, Sept. 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/research/staff-reports/sr740.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RHV-SA99]
(explaining basic mechanics of repo contracts and measuring current market size of
U.S. repo market); Dennis Kuo et al., Identifying Term Interbank Loans from Fedwire
Payments Data 6-8 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 603, Mar. 2013),
2016]
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In the presence of such market mechanisms, liquidity injected through
OMO should be redistributed to the banks or other institutions most in
need of it, assuming they are healthy or have appropriate collateral.3 9 In
light of these developments, some economists have argued that OMO
should be the sole tool that the Fed uses to respond to liquidity
shortages.
40
The second and related development has been the rise of the
shadow banking system, a complex array of market-based mechanisms
and nonbank institutions that serve many of the same economic
functions traditionally played by banks. 4 The Crisis revealed that the
shadow banking system can be subject to runs just like banks and that
runs on the shadow banking system can similarly have adverse spillover
effects on the health of the real economy.42 The massive scale of this
system and its vulnerabilities also demonstrate the inevitable mismatch
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff-reports/sr603.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3WSS-HR7H] (providing overview of function and importance of
interbank lending market, which "consists of unsecured loans made from one bank to
another, or more broadly, from one financial institution to another").
39. See, e.g., Mehrling, supra note 26, at 27 ("The way it was supposed to work is that
the Fed would lend freely to the [primary] dealers and arbitrage would do the rest.").
Deposit insurance similarly reduces the need for a LOLR, as depositors have little reason
to flee if they know the government will make them whole. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein,
Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. Econ. 57, 84 (2012) ("[T]he
government [could] try to stem the amount of socially costly fire sales that occur for a
given amount of short-term bank debt. This could be done with either deposit insurance
or a lender-of-last-resort policy." (emphasis omitted)).
40. See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, 7 Fin.
Stability Rev. 151, 157 (1999) (providing overview of literature supporting this view); see
generally Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from
the Fed's First 100 Years 36-38 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-
065B, 2012) (describing "longstanding debate in academic and policy forums
concern[ing] how a lender of last resort should provide liquidity, and in particular
whether the lender of last resort should ever lend directly to individual financial
institutions" and identifying major proponents on both sides).
41. See Erik F. Gerding, Law, Bubbles, and Financial Regulation 399-401 (2014) ("[T]he
shadow banking system and its component financial instruments serve many of the functions of
traditional depository banking, yet operate by connecting borrowers to investors in capital
markets."); Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 1-3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report
No. 458, July 2010) [hereinafter Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking], http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staffireports/sr458.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TJB-CBLH] ("Shadow banks
intermediate credit through a wide range of securitization and secured funding techniques...
[and] over the past decade, the shadow banking system provided sources of funding for credit
by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like, short-term liabilities."); Kathryn
Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017)
[hereinafter Judge, Information Gaps] (manuscript at 21-22) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (observing in 1970s "an array of market-based mechanisms [emerged] that
fulfill many of the economic functions long performed by banks" and these mechanisms are
collectively known today as the shadow banking system).
42. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,
104 J. Fin. Econ. 425, 425-28 (2012) (describing Crisis as "system wide bank run"
emanating from securitized, rather than traditional, banking system).
854
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
between the scope of the Fed's oversight authority and the domains in
which systemic risk can build. While the Fed's oversight authority has
been expanded post-Crisis, nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act alters the
general tendency for financial activity to move to less regulated
domains.
43
B. The Crisis
Despite the questions about the need for a LOLR willing to provide
liquidity through mechanisms other than OMO in today's markets, the
Fed quickly took up the role of providing more aggressive liquidity
injections to individual financial institutions during the Crisis. When the
Fed first recognized that a lack of liquidity seemed to be adversely
affecting market functioning in August 2007, it responded by encoura-
ging banks to make greater use of the discount window, the only
standing LOLR facility." When bank borrowing remained modest, the
Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) .15 The TAF was available
only to banks otherwise eligible to borrow through the discount window
and it required comparable collateral, but through its structure and lack
of historical baggage, the TAF was designed to be free from the
perceived stigma that many viewed as inhibiting utilization of the
discount window.46
When conditions in the financial markets got worse rather than
better, the Fed expanded its use of new facilities. In March 2008, around
the time of Bear Stearns' failure, the Fed implemented two new faci-
lities.47 These facilities were distinctive in that they provided liquidity
support directly to primary dealers-that is, the securities dealers with
whom the Fed engages in OMO, including all of the major investment
43. Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 52 (arguing "regulations
implementing provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act targeting the shadow banking system
seem likely to fall short" of legislator's goals for reforming money market mutual funds).
44. The Discount Rate, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., http://www.federal
reserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.hun [http://perma.cc/R6EZ-Y6CN] (last updated
Oct. 13, 2015) (providing more detailed description of Fed's standing facilities).
45. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm
[http://perma.cc/79QL-PKES].
46. E.g., Olivier Armantier et al., Discount Window Stigma During the 2007-2008
Financial Crisis, 118 J. Fin. Econ. 317, 326 (2015) (empirically establishing banks were
willing to pay more to borrow through TAF than to borrow from discount window and
thus "provid[ing] strong evidence of the existence of DW stigma"); Gary B. Gorton &
Andrew Metrick, The Federal Reserve and Financial Regulation: The First Hundred Years
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19292, 2013), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w19292.pdf [http://perma.cc/B63B-UHTP] (providing historical
overview of processes through which discount window became stigmatized and identifying
stigma as one of the major challenges Fed faced in Crisis).
47. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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banks-rather than regulated banks.48 To do so, the Fed invoked its
authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which enables
the Fed to provide liquidity to nonbanks under "unusual and exigent
circumstances. '49 Like the discount window, these facilities conferred
benefits on the institutions eligible to borrow through them even when
those institutions did not use the facility, as counterparties had less
reason to be concerned about the capacity of an eligible institution to
obtain liquidity if needed.50
Following Lehman's failure in September 2008, the Fed got even
more aggressive, creating four additional facilities to provide support to
segments of the market that in the Fed's view were experiencing signifi-
cant distress. 5' For example, to help revive the securitization market, the
Fed created a facility that allowed users to borrow funds on a non-
recourse basis so long as they provided the requisite collateral, qualifying
AAA-rated asset-backed securities (ABS).52 Similarly, to support the
market for commercial paper-short-term debt used by a wide variety of
firms for liquidity management and other purposes-the Fed created a
facility that provided a liquidity backstop to U.S.-based issuers of com-
mercial paper.53 The diversity of facilities the Fed created illustrates the
incredible flexibility of the Fed's LOLR authority. The Dodd-Frank Act
imposes some new constraints on the Fed's authority, primarily limiting
48. Office of the Inspector Gen., Fed. Reserve, The Federal Reserve's Section 13(3)
Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity: Function, Status, and Risk
Management 21 (2010) [hereinafter Office of the Inspector Gen., Lending Facilities],
https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRSLending-_Facilities-Report-final-1 1-23-
10_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/T3BA-PL9E].
49. Id. at i. Some of the programs actually relied upon an amalgam of the Fed's
powers and hence had to be approved by both the FOMC and the Board. See, e.g. Minutes
of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Mar. 18, 2008, at 8-9 [hereinafter Minutes of
the March 18, 2008 FOMC Meeting], http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/fomcminutes20080318.pdf [http:/perma.cc/RJU2-2X8C] (voting to authorize New
York Fed to lend up to $200 billion to primary dealers through Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF)); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF) and TSLF Options Program (TOP), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/reform-tslf.htm [http://pema.cc/7FKW-XC4U] (last updated Dec. 9, 2014)
(noting TSLF was instituted under Section 13(3) and therefore required Board
authorization).
50. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on June 24-25, 2008, at 166
(statement of William Dudley) [hereinafter June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080625meeting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T4NU-YC34] (explaining Lehman's access to Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (PDCF) materially altered willingness of counterparties to continue to work with it).
51. See Office of the Inspector Gen., Lending Facilities, supra note 48, at 57, 69, 81,
93 (summarizing traits of additional facilities).
52. Id. at 105.
53. Id. at 69.
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its ability to provide individualized support of the type used to bail out
Bear Stearns and AIG, but the flexibility otherwise remains intact.
54
The key point to highlight, which comes out in richer detail in the
Fed's deliberations, is that Fed policymakers were remarkably dynamic
and creative along some dimensions, and yet simultaneously remarkably
constrained in their creativity and responsiveness along other
dimensions. 55 More concretely, the Fed was exceptionally innovative in
devising new ways to facilitate the flow of liquidity to the shadow banking
system and to protect the financial system as it existed. At the same time,
Fed policymakers remained largely tethered to the assumption that the
near-exclusive function of the Fed's LOLR authority was to prevent
insufficient liquidity from harming the financial system despite signals
that lack of information was a significant and potentially greater factor
inhibiting market functioning.56 Similarly, despite the dramatic changes
in the rationales for LOLR support and the nature of the financial system
since Bagehot's time, Fed policymakers regularly and explicitly invoked
Bagehot's dictum to explain the Fed's actions. 57 And, despite finding
creative ways to provide significant liquidity support to the shadow
banking system,58 Fed policymakers regularly took cover in the pre-
vailing, and outdated, regulatory regime to deflect suggestions that they
should bear any meaningful responsibility for the financial health of the
institutions populating that system.5 9
Given the structure of the Fed, it is not possible to draw any strong
generalizations about why "the Fed" was so responsive and innovative in
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343
(2012). The Dodd-Frank Act also left the Fed's authority to provide banks liquidity
through the discount window and other facilities fully intact. Id.
55. See infra Part III (examining mixed responses of Fed policymakers to Crisis).
56. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve, in The
Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Bernanke, Origins and
Mission] (stating "provision of liquidity" is "main tool of central banks in dealing with
financial panics or financial crises" and asserting "providing short-term credit to financial
institutions.., can help calm the market, can help stabilize those institutions, and can
help mitigate or end a financial crisis").
57. Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 Law &
Contemp. Probs, no. 3, 2015, at 65, 79 [hereinafter Judge, Soft Constraints] ("During the
recent Crisis, Bagehot's name and [a] simplified version of his dictum were invoked with
great frequency by members of the Fed and outside commentators.").
58. See infra notes 128-131 (discussing means employed by regulators to increase
liquidity in shadow banking system).
59. E.g., Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation 4 (Columbia Law
& Econ. Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 370, 2010) [hereinafter Ricks, Shadow Banking],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1571290 [http://perma.cc/2M9N-
JTYC] ("[A] t the height of the crisis, very nearly the entire emergency policy response was
designed to prevent shadow bank defaults through a series of 'temporary' and
'extraordinary' interventions.").
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some regards and so constrained in others.6" A variety of factors likely
contributed. Fed policymakers faced a genuine challenge. The LOLR
literature provided minimal guidance with respect to how the evolution
of modern financial systems may have changed the appropriate role of a
LOLR, beyond the claims, quickly belied by reality, that such changes
mooted the need for a LOLR to provide support through any mecha-
nism beyond OMO. 6 1 Fed policymakers may also have perceived that
invoking Bagehot's dictum could provide both justification and a cover
for the scope of the Fed's operations.6 2 Regardless of the rationales for
the Fed's actions during the Crisis, the very process of identifying more
effective ways for the Fed to deploy its control over liquidity to bring
about the timely resolution of a financial crisis could transform the Fed's
behavior in response to future crises. If Fed officials failed to appreciate
how they could most effectively use their authority, then the insights
gleaned from the analysis here could prompt officials to be more
responsive in the future. If Fed officials were constrained by concerns
about the perceived legitimacy of using their authority in the ways
proposed, providing a new vision about how the Fed ought to use this
authority could empower Fed officials to take the actions they recognize
as needed to promote stability. And, if Fed officials failed to act in order
to deflect responsibility for troubled institutions and markets, this Essay
could spur Fed officials into action by making it more likely that
Congress and others will hold them to account should they fail to act
when the proposed paradigm suggests they could and should do so.
II. LEVERAGE AS CREDITOR
This Part introduces the claim that the Fed should use its LOLR
authority to further its role as information-coordination agent during
periods of persistent systemic distress. It then briefly shows how a central
bank can determine that it is facing a persistent liquidity crisis and how a
central bank should shift its approach to using its LOLR authority once it
makes that determination. In order to allow the case study of the Crisis to
animate the claim, the analysis here is kept brief.63
60. See infra Part III (providing overview of key decisionmaking bodies that
collectively constitute the Fed).
61. E.g., Tucker, supra note 2, at 10 (describing "relative neglect of LOLR in the core
literature on central banking over the past twenty years" and attributing this "tragedy,"
which "contributed to central banks losing their way" during Crisis, to fact that until Crisis,
"LOLR was widely regarded as a relic of the past").
62. See Judge, Soft Constraints, supra note 57, at 81 ("Bagehot's dictum provides
cover for one of the most controversial aspects of the Fed's actions during the Crisis-its
extensive lending to nonbank institutions-and was invoked by Fed policymakers to justify
these actions.").
63. See infra Part V (providing more thorough analysis of counterarguments).
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A. The Claim
This Essay argues that the Fed's LOLR authority is a powerful tool and
one that has often been ineffectively utilized as a result of the near-
exclusive focus on liquidity shortages as an aggravator of systemic distress.
Insufficient liquidity can have significant and adverse effects on market
functioning, so providing liquidity will always be among the aims a LOLR
should seek to achieve.64 When a liquidity shortage is the byproduct of an
exogenous shock, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the dramatic one-
day decline of the stock market known as Black Monday, the current
paradigm suggesting that the LOLR should flood the market for liquidity,
subject only to constraints relating to moral hazard and credit risk, likely
remains optimal.6 5 Under such conditions, liquidity alone should suffice to
restore stability and the disruptions to market functioning should be in-
herently finite so long as a central bank provides the requisite support.66
But not all liquidity shortages fit this mold.67
During the Crisis and other periods of financial distress, liquidity
shortages have persisted despite aggressive efforts by the Fed to inject
new liquidity into the market.68 When the ongoing provision of liquidity
fails to quell a liquidity shortage, that persistence conveys information. It
reveals that the shortage is also a signal that there are deeper ills pla-
guing the financial system. Under these circumstances, the provision of
64. See Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Federal Reserve's Policy Actions During the Financial Crisis and Lessons for the Future 2-3
(May 13, 2010), http://vww.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20lOO5l3a.pdf
[http://penna.cc/R53D-WKP3] (identifying "liquidity pressures" as central to Crisis and
stressing Fed's need to adapt to address these "strains").
65. See, e.g., Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Systemic Risk and the International Lender of Last Resort (Sept. 28, 2007)
[hereinafter Mishkin, Remarks], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
mishkin20070928a.htm [http://perma.cc/4HB6-VRWH] (identifying these as two
instances when Fed "acted successfully to prevent potentially devastating financial
seizures").
66. See Kaufman, supra note 23, at 174-78 (analyzing effectiveness of LOLR support
when facing certain types of exogenous shocks).
67. While this paper is the first to argue that this distinction merits a prominent place in
analyses of how LOLRs should respond when facing liquidity shortages, others have recognized
that liquidity shortages can be grouped in this manner. Compare Transcript of the Fed. Open
Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Sept. 18, 2007, at 89 (statement of Frederick Mishkin) [hereinafter
September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting], [http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/
20070918.htm] [https://www.perma.cc/6NNG-UPUE] (making this distinction and identifying
previous examples of each), with Frederic S. Mishkin, Economics of Money, Banking, and
Financial Markets 437-38 (10th ed. 2013) (discussing LOLR function without making any
reference to this distinction).
68. E.g., infra section II.B (showing Crisis followed this pattern); see also Transcript of the
Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Aug. 5, 2008, at 90 (statement of Frederic Mishkin)
[hereinafter August 5, 2008 FOMC Meeting], http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/FOMC20080805meetings.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9SS-G9CF] ('Just as a reminder,
remember that in the Great Depression, when... something hit the fan, [laughter] it actually
occurred close to a year after the initial negative shock .... We are now a year into this.").
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liquidity alone will never suffice to restore market functioning and could
make the situation worse.
The notion that liquidity alone will not suffice to restore stability
once lost is not a new insight. For example, well over twenty years ago,
Charles Calomiris and Gary Gorton showed that once a panic takes hold,
the provision of liquidity alone will not suffice to end the panic.69 Rather,
in their analysis, once a panic takes hold, markets will resume healthy
functioning only after a credible source, such as the government or a
clearinghouse, provides market participants with the information about
where the weaknesses lie. 70 While much has changed in the financial
markets, this fundamental fact has not.
71
The recent work of a number of leading economists has brought to
life the further possibility that the provision of liquidity can be counter-
productive during periods of prolonged market distress. Gary Gorton,
Andrew Metrick, and Lei Xie, for example, have demonstrated that
under such conditions, market participants tend to provide (and thus
obtain) funding through mechanisms with increasingly short maturities,
thereby increasing the fragility of the overall financial system and
reducing its capacity to withstand further adverse developments. 2
Concretely, this means that one reason the ripple effects of Lehman
Brothers's failure in September 2008 were so crippling was that the
overall financial system was significantly more fragile than it had been
when the Crisis started in August 2007. Similarly, Viral Acharya and
Bruce Tuckman have shown that traditional LOLR activities enable
financial institutions to delever at a slower rate than the market would
otherwise require. 73 This is good if the problems are exogenous and the
69. See Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models,
Facts, and Bank Regulation, in Financial Markets and Financial Crises 109, 160-62 (R.
Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991) (using asymmetric information theory to explain why provision
of liquidity may be insufficient to resolve panics).
70. Cf. id. at 161 (arguing open market operations by themselves will not be effective
in quelling panics because "[t]he problem is not that depositors want cash for its own
sake... but [that they lack information and] are concerned that their bank will fail").
71. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial
Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 351-52 (2014)
("Increased mandatory disclosure is the simplest response to market failure that turns on
information costs. Disclosure was inadequate within and across all markets implicated in
the Crisis .... ); see also infra section II.C (arguing provision of information to market
participants should be an important part of Fed policy response to crises).
72. Gary B. Gorton, Andrew Metrick & Lei Xie, The Flight from Maturity 1 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20027, 2014), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w20027.pdf [http://perma.cc/X368-5TDS] (arguing "the financial system became
increasingly fragile during the crisis, so that even a small shock would have led to a large
response at that point in the crisis").
73. E.g., Viral V. Acharya & Bruce Tuckman, Unintended Consequences of LOLR
Facilities: The Case of Illiquid Leverage 3, 4 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/
np/res/seminars/2013/arc/pdf/viral.pdf [http://perma.cc/AG7V-DL4M] (showing access
to LOLR "give[s] the bank leeway to reduce deleveraging sales of illiquid assets" and
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deleveraging inefficient, but by rendering institutions more fragile in the
face of subsequent adverse shocks, this effect is quite troubling in the
context of a persistent liquidity shortage. There is thus a growing body of
work that suggests that during periods of prolonged distress, market
participants change their activities in ways that increase the fragility of
the system. This alone provides a reason to rethink how a LOLR should
respond when facing a persistent liquidity shortage.
The second reason to rethink how a LOLR should use that authority
when facing a persistent liquidity shortage is that persistent liquidity
shortages also give rise to new opportunities. When liquidity is in short
supply, the value of liquidity goes up and so too does the leverage the
Fed enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity. The Fed's singular
access to unlimited liquidity thus becomes a far more potent tool right
when the Fed needs it most. Just as importantly, the site of liquidity
shortages will often serve as a roadmap to the sectors of the financial
system that are facing problems that need to be addressed before stability
can return, the ultimate aim of the Fed's LOLR authority. Through
properly designed facilities, the Fed can extract information and address
problems right at their source, irrespective of the prevailing, and typically
outdated, regulatory regime. By drawing attention to these opportunities
and making an affirmative case for how the Fed can use its LOLR
authority as part of its role as information-coordination agent during
periods of systemic distress, this Essay complements the recent work on
the reasons that flooding the market with liquidity may be problematic
during such times.
The core claim is simple: The Fed ought to use the leverage that it
enjoys by virtue of controlling access to liquidity to acquire the infor-
mation it needs to understand the magnitude and contours of the under-
lying issues causing the market dysfunction to continue. It should also
use that leverage, in conjunction with its other sources of authority, to
facilitate the redistribution of information among market participants
and other government actors in order to bring about a timely resolution
to the underlying issues that it discovers.
74
Critically, the role of information-coordination agent is not an
entirely new one for the Fed, nor is it one that would require any expan-
sion of the Fed's already vast authority. The Fed has long been at the
forefront of efforts to contain growing financial crises, 75 and collecting
and coordinating the distribution of information have always been corn-
explaining "facts of broker-dealer deleveraging... [demonstrate] that during a crisis, with
security of LOLR facilities in place, broker-dealers delivered relatively slowly, and the weaker
among them delivered the most slowly").
74. This is based on the notion that containing financial crises is a central role of
central banks. See, e.g., Bernanke, Origins and Mission, supra note 56, at 3 (explaining
one function of Fed is "to keep the financial system working normally and, in
particular ... to either prevent or... mitigate financial panics or financial crises").
75. Id.
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ponents of those efforts. The Fed often played, albeit inconsistently, the
role of collecting and coordinating the distribution of information in the
recent Crisis,76 and it is one that the Fed has played during other
episodes that threatened systemic stability. For example, when the pos-
sible failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM)
posed a threat to the stability of the financial system in 1998, the New
York Fed played a critical role in identifying and coordinating a response
to that threat.77 Consistent with the paradigm proposed here, the Fed
operated in a way that was agile and responsive to the source of the
threat, even though the Fed has no supervisory or other authority over
hedge funds like LTCM.78 It similarly lacked such authority over the
many investment banks that played a critical role in funding the bailout
and that would have been harmed had LTCM failed. 79 This ultimately
enabled the Fed to coordinate an entirely private bailout of LTCM, elimi-
nating the need for the government to make difficult decisions about
whether to become further involved in the debacle."0
While the Fed did not have to use any of its formal sources of auth-
ority in connection with that debacle, its decision to play the critical role
that it did in facilitating a smooth resolution of LTCM illustrates the
longstanding assumption by the Fed and others that the Fed should play
a central role in crisis management. The situation also illustrates the ways
the Fed has often and appropriately been quite creative in how it uses its
formal and informal sources of authority in executing that role."A
Despite this related incident and the role the Fed played com-
municating and coordinating with Treasury and other officials during
the Crisis, the Fed often failed to use its LOLR authority as a mechanism
for gathering information that would have been valuable to the Fed,
76. See infra Part III (exploring contours of Fed's dual role as provider of both
liquidity and information regarding financial risk).
77. See Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal
Reserve System), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.htm
[http://per-ma.cc/XZA6-7B2B] (reporting on New York Fed's role in "facilitating private
sector refinancing of the large hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management").
78. See Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term
Capital Management 186 (2000) ("Long-Term was not a bank, and the Fed does not have
authority over hedge funds.").
79. See id. at 214-18 (recounting LTCM rescue, which included investment banks
such as Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch); Michael P. Malloy, 3 Banking Law and
Regulation § 14.04[C] (2d. ed Supp. 2016) (noting Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
only became subject to Fed supervision in 2008 when they converted to Bank Holding
Companies); Edward V. Murphy, Cong. Research Serv., R43087, Who Regulates Whom
and How? An Overview of U.S. Financial Regulatory Policy for Banking and Security
Markets 25-26 (2015) (explaining Fed had "no regulatory jurisdiction" over investment
banks pre-2008).
80. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 78 (providing detailed account of episode).
81. See infra section V.A (discussing Fed's historical flexibility in adapting its
instruments to achieve evolving aims).
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other policyrnakers, and market participants. Again, this may well reflect
a lack of theoretical support for such an approach, a legitimate desire by
Fed officials not to overstep the implicit limits on how they ought to use
their vast authority, or a less legitimate desire to avoid accountability by
hewing to an outdated regulatory regime. The case study here reveals
moments that support all three conjectures. Regardless of the rationale
or justification for such behavior in the past, this Essay82 provides much
needed guidance for how the Fed might more effectively use this
authority when facing the next financial crisis.
An important benefit of altering the Fed's LOLR activities in the
manner proposed is that in addition to enhancing the Fed's ability to
contain a growing financial crisis, it also helps mitigate the accountability
issues that arise when the Fed uses this authority. Banks and other fin-
ancial institutions generally borrow from the Fed only in circumstances
where the Fed is providing more favorable terms (or more liquidity) than
the institution can otherwise obtain.8 3 Additionally, mere access to Fed
support can benefit eligible institutions even in the absence of actual
borrowing.8 4 Accurately perceiving that the financial institutions who
receive such support disproportionately benefit from it has animated
much of the post-Crisis backlash against the Fed and has led many to call
for its overall authority to be curtailed significantly.85 Some Fed policy-
makers had similar concerns about the fairness of the Fed's actions and
seemed to want to be able to impose more of a quid pro quo on the Fed's
LOLR operations. 8 6 Yet, there are good reasons for the Fed not to demand
82. Guidance is also provided by other post-Crisis research focusing on the
ramifications of the Fed continuing to abide by outdated guidance in how it ought to
deploy its LOLR authority during periods of persistent systemic distress.
83. Olivier Armantier et al., Discount Window Stigma During the 2007-2008
Financial Crisis 18-21 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 483, Jan. 2011),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr483.pdf
[http://perma.cc/H5K9-SS3R] (showing financial institutions avoided borrowing from
Fed's discount window during 2008 crisis and were willing to pay premium to borrow from
alternative sources).
84. See, e.g., infra section III.C.4.
85. E.g., Tucker, supra note 2, at 10 (observing "especially in the United States the
atmosphere [surrounding discussions regarding the appropriate role for a LOLR] is...
toxic, poisoning debates about central banking more generally"); Jeffrey M. Lacker,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, The Fed as Lender of Last Resort: Comments on
"Rules for a Lender of Last Resort" by Michael Bordo I (May 30, 2014), http://
www.richmondfed.org/pressroom/speeches/president-jeff lacker/2014/pdf/lacker-
speech-20140530.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HVW-EQWS] (explaining "[c]redit extension," as
LOLR, "arguably has been the most problematic and contentious aspect of central banking,
and it seems likely to remain so for the foreseeable future").
86. E.g., Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on March 10, 2008,
at 11 (statement of Richard Fisher) [hereinafter March 10, 2008 FOMC Conference Call],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080310confcall.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TEJ4-DK74] ("I can understand the carrot side of this thing, and we are
doing it for the reasons that you stated, and I am very sympathetic to the argument. The
question is, [w]hat do we get in return... ?").
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economic recompense commensurate with the value of the liquidity sup-
port it provides through LOLR facilities. Stigma often already discourages
borrowing and the Fed usually provides such support only when the
overall financial system would benefit from an institution's willingness to
take it.87 The proposed approach is a way to balance these competing
interests. By making informational and other noneconomic demands in
connection with the largesse of cheap liquidity, the Fed may be able to
mitigate concerns about legitimacy and fairness while enhancing (rather
than undermining) the Fed's efforts to restore market functioning.8 8
B. Identifying a Persistent Liquidity Shortage
A threshold challenge to the claim that a LOLR should revise how it
uses that authority when facing a persistent liquidity shortage is whether
it is realistic to expect that central banks will be able to recognize a
shortage as persistent in real time. In practice, this potential challenge is
not all that challenging, as reflected in the evolution of the Crisis.
Despite the Fed's myriad efforts to inject additional liquidity into the
market starting in August 2007, conditions remained strained throughout
the period that followed. This was evident from a number of indicia
available in real time. For example, one important indicator of liquidity
conditions and bank health is the Libor-OIS spread, which is the
difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and the
overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, a rate that reflects market expectations
of overnight rates over the term of the contract. Figure 1 shows the three-
month Libor-OIS spread and the six-month Libor-OIS spread for the
period from January 2006 through September 2008:89
87. E.g., Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States, 1867-1960, at 268-69 (1963) (arguing Fed should use "penalty rate" during
normal times but not during times of crisis); Armentier et al., supra note 83, at 32-34
(finding "strong evidence ... of [discount window] stigma").
88. See infra section IV.A (addressing concern that even proposed conditions might
depress usage in problematic ways).
89. Notably, all of these measures likely understate the liquidity and credit challenges as
a result of Libor manipulation by reporting banks, and members of the FOMC were aware
that this was likely. See, e.g., Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on April 29-
30, 2008, at 5 (statement of William Dudley) [hereinafter April 29-30, 2008 FOMC Meeting],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080430meeting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PT6T-54Z3] ("There is considerable evidence that the official LIBOR
fixing understates the rates paid by many banks for funding.").
[Vol. 116:843
2016] LENDER OF LAST RESORT 865
Figure 1: Libor-OIS Spreads (Nov. 2008-Sept. 2008)
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Throughout this period, Fed policymakers regularly monitored
these indicators and understood that they showed that financial markets
remained distressed.9 0 Fed policymnakers also regularly stated that the
country was in the midst of a financial crisis that had started in August
2007.91 And, as will be described in detail in Part III, they were aware that
the Fed's myriad efforts to inject liquidity into the system had not had
the desired aim of quelling the ongoing market dysfunction.9 2 The
trajectory of the Crisis thus illustrates how persistent liquidity crises will
reveal themselves and can be identified even without the benefit of
90. See, e.g., Rajdeep Sengupta & Yu Man Tam, The LIBOR-OIS Spread as a
Summary Indicator, Econ. Synopses, No. 25 (2008), https://research.stlouisfed.org/
publications/es/08/ES0825.pdf [http://penna.cc/VFS3-GK79] ("The LIBOR-OIS spread
has been a closely watched barometer of distress in money markets for more than a
year.").
91. See, e.g., infra notes 162-166 and accompanying text (noting Fed policymakers
during this period recognized state of economy resembled that of other major financial
crises and were concerned conditions might get worse).
92. See, e.g., infra notes 181-186, 217-221 and accompanying text (providing
evidence of Fed's awareness facilities they were using to inject liquidity had failed to fully
quell market dysfunction).Just as importantly, this type of temporal delay is not unique to
the Crisis. E.g., Aug. 5, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 68, at 90 (statement of Frederic
Mishkin) ("Just as a reminder, remember that in the Great Depression, when...
something hit the fan, [laughter] it actually occurred close to a year after the initial
negative shock .... We are now a year into this.").
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hindsight, enabling Fed policymakers to alter their response in the ways
proposed.
C. The Aims: Focusing on Information
Underlying this Essay's claim that we should rethink how a central
bank can best use its LOLR authority when facing a persistent liquidity
shortage is the recognition that today's financial markets look quite
different than the markets of Bagehot's day. In addition to being far more
complete than markets of yesteryear, today's markets and institutions are
also more complex and dynamic. While the additional mechanisms for
redistributing liquidity transform the informational content of persistent
liquidity shortfalls, the complexity and dynamism increase the need for the
information such signals now convey. These changes also transform the
role of the Fed and other regulators, as the dynamism of the system and
the massive information gaps that arise from the current regime increase
the need for financial regulators to be agile and responsive when facing
indications that panic may be taking hold.93 Precisely because this Essay is
calling on the Fed to be agile and responsive in light of what it learns in
the moment, it is impossible to fashion a detailed roadmap in advance.
Nonetheless, financial crises follow patterns. Two key ingredients for a
financial system to recover from a state of prolonged distress are (1)
regulators and market participants must have credible information about
the risks to which banks and other financial institutions are exposed
9 4
and (2) those institutions must have sufficient capital in light of those
risks.95
That financial stability depends on banks and other financial
institutions having sufficient capital in light of the risks to which they are
exposed is reflected in the fact that capital regulation was the corner-
93. See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 26-40 (describing information
gaps and their impact on systemic stability).
94. See, e.g., Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 69, at 124-27 (explaining when
"depositors are unable to distinguish individual bank risks, they may withdraw a large
volume of deposits from all banks" during a panic).
95. See, e.g., Allen N. Berger et al., The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions, 19J.
Banking & Fin. 393, 424-25 (1995) (highlighting importance of capital requirements in
protecting government-the largest unsecured creditor of most U.S. banks-and in
guarding economy against negative externalities caused by bank failures); Daniel K. Tarullo,
Capital Regulation Across Financial Intermediaries (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20l5O928a.htm [http://perma.cc/4K2LN72S] ("In
the wake of the crisis, Basel III strengthened capital quality and levels across the board. In
addition, capital surcharges were imposed on about thirty banks of global systemic
importance .... ); Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Regulatory Reform Since the Financial Crisis (May 2, 2012), http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarllo20l2O5O2a.htm [http://perma.cc/R942-LMP7]
(discussing role of capital requirements in post-Crisis regulatory reform and noting "they are
central to good financial regulation, precisely because they are available to absorb all kinds of
potential losses, unanticipated as well as anticipated").
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stone of early efforts to harmonize the regulation of banks in advanced
economies.
96
The importance of high-quality information has just as long of a
history, though it has not received quite as much attention. Looking
back, the inability of depositors to readily distinguish healthy banks from
weak ones has long been a factor contributing to the spread of panics
and bank runs.97 The growth of the shadow banking system, an inter-
mediation regime that is larger than the U.S. banking system and rep-
licates the basic economic functions of banks, alters the information
dynamics that contribute to fragility, but by no means reduces the impor-
tance of information. 8 In other work, I show theoretically why infor-
mation gaps are likely to be large in the shadow banking system and how
those information gaps inhibit market functioning in certain states of the
world.99 Given that the value of information is often state-contingent and
that information is costly to produce, ramping up information
production in certain states of the world will often be an optimal regu-
latory strategy. 100 Just as importantly, it will often be necessary regardless
of whether optimal or not because market participants lack the incen-
tives and regulators lack the authority and resources to generate all of
the information that might be pertinent in all of the states of the world
that could come to be.°1
0
96. Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 29, 219-21 ("[During the 1980s,] U.S.
regulators worked with their foreign counterparts to develop risk-based capital standards
[through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] .... The Basel I Risk-Based
Capital Guidelines, promulgated in 1988, set forth requirements for minimum capital
relative to a risk-adjusted measure of assets.").
97. See, e.g., id. at 216-18 ("Well-capitalized banks are less likely to falter or fail than
poorly capitalized banks. Thus capital requirements help protect depositors, other
creditors, the FDIC, and the financial system.").
98. See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 30-33 (describing different ways
information can facilitate and impede market functioning and how those dynamics can be
state contingent); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 331-50 (exploring role
information costs played as type of "market friction" in the Crisis); Gary Gorton & Andrew
Winton, I.A Financial Intermediation, in Handbook of the Economics of Finance 431, 505
(George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) (providing information-based theory of
panics).
99. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 Stan. L. Rev 657, 690-97 (2012) [hereinafter Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes] (arguing information gaps in securitization process may alter
behavior of market participants in ways that exacerbate systemic risk); Judge, Information
Gaps, supra note 41, at 24-25, 33-41 (explaining means by which information gaps
expand in shadow banking system); see also Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 Eur.
Fin. Mgmt. 1, 11 (2009) (noting shadow banking claims are not traded in markets
resembling those economists tend to focus on).
100. Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 49, 54-56 (pointing to "important
role that more robust disclosure policies could play in limiting information gaps and the
fragility that results").
101. See id. at 8-19 (contrasting information-related incentives of money claimants
with those of equity claimants); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 331-50
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As the remainder of this section conveys in greater detail and Part III
brings to life, information production and redistribution are critical to
the success of any effort aimed at crisis containment. Extracting infor-
mation and producing information, providing market participants with
the credible information they require to resume working directly with
one another, and identifying capital shortfalls in a timely fashion are thus
the three aims that are the focus here and are among the core aims that
the Fed will want to pursue when using the leverage it enjoys as the
LOLR in the face of persistent liquidity shortages.
1. Extracting Information. - When liquidity problems persist, the
first priority for any central bank should be to understand why those
problems are persisting. The importance of the Fed having timely access
to information about the health of financial institutions and markets and
the distribution of risks is well recognized and is a primary justification
for the Fed's significant oversight authority. 10 2 Nonetheless, the Fed's
supervisory authority will almost inevitably be insufficient to enable the
Fed to gather the information that it needs. This is in part because when
the Fed is acting as a supervisor, its primary function historically has been
microprudential-i.e., focused on the financial health and risk exposures
of individual institutions with the aim of reducing the likelihood that any
single firm will fail.' During a period of systemic distress, however, the
information that will be most valuable to the Fed often will be
macroprudential in nature-i.e., focused on matters that affect the
stability of the overall financial system, such as how exposures to a
particular risk are distributed across market participants, or the nature
and size of interconnections among different institutions and markets.
Another limitation is that the supervisory scheme is highly fragmented
and will inevitably be incomplete and backward looking. Even with the
post-Crisis reforms, the regulatory regime in the United States remains
highly fragmented. There are three separate bank regulators and a wide
array of important financial firms and markets that are overseen by
nonbank regulators, like the Securities and Exchange Commission
(arguing costs of obtaining information on timing of housing bubble burst and
consequences of housing price decline kept information from reaching market and
contributed to crisis).
102. See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Role of Central Banks in Bank
Supervision in the United States and the United Kingdom, 28 Brook. J. Int'l L. 411, 432
(2003) ("Close relationships with banks will assist the central bank in anticipating the
direction of the economy and in addressing financial crises.").
103. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: Implementing a
Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter
Bernanke, Macroprudential Approach], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/bernanke20110505a.htm [http://perma.cc/2SK2-ZJR8] ("[T]he traditional, or
'microprudential,' approach to regulation and supervision ... is concerned primarily with
the safety and soundness of individual institutions, markets, or infrastructures.").
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(SEC).° 4 Insurance regulation, meanwhile, remains largely state-based." 5
The Dodd-Frank Act makes important progress on reducing the com-
munication and coordination problems that arise from this dispersion of
authority through the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC).°6 Under the leadership of the Treasury Secretary, the
FSOC's membership includes all of the leading federal financial regu-
lators and representatives from state regulators, 10 7 and the Dodd-Frank
Act allows the FSOC to designate nonbanks as systemically significant and
thereby subject those firms to Fed oversight."0 ' The Dodd-Frank Act also
created the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to supplement the
FSOC's operations with broad information-gathering authority.'0 9 These
changes mitigate some of the specific information problems that arose
during the Crisis." 0 When facing the next financial crisis, the OFR
should be an important ally for the Fed in its efforts to gather pertinent
information. And the FSOC should serve as an important body through
which the Fed can more effectively disseminate relevant insights to other
financial regulators and work with those regulators to address defi-
ciencies outside the Fed's domain. Nonetheless, these changes by no
means alleviate the core information and coordination issues that arise
from the dispersion of authority among so many different regulators, and
hence the importance of having one powerful and agile body play a lead
role identifying such threats.
Just as relevant as the failure of the Dodd-Frank Act to funda-
mentally reform the fragmented regulatory regime is the inability-and
hence failure-of the Act to alter the historical pattern that the very
process of implementing financial regulations causes activity to move to
less regulated domains."' A leading example, and one that poses funda-
mental and still unaddressed informational challenges, is the rise of the
shadow banking system. The shadow banking system is a capital-markets-
104. See Carnell, Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 60-65 (enumerating bank and
nonbank regulators).
105. Id. at 570.
106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §
5321 (2012) (establishing FSOC).
107. Id. § 5321(b) (identifying FSOC members).
108. Id. § 5323(a)(1) ("The Council... may determine that a U.S. nonbank financial
company shall be supervised by the Board of Governors and shall be subject to prudential
standards... if the Council determines that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank
financial company... could pose a threat to... financial stability ... ").
109. See id. §§ 5342-5343 (establishing OFR and authorizing it to "sponsor and
conduct research projects" and "share data and information.., with the [FSOC]").
110. See Bernanke, Macroprudential Approach, supra note 103 ("[The OFR's]
collection and analysis of financial-sector data should allow regulators to see more of the
financial landscape and better equip them to identify systemic risks and other emerging
threats.").
111. See generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 227, 243-44
(2010) (defining conditions creating opportunities for regulatory arbitrage).
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based intermediation regime that serves many of the functions tradi-
tionally filled only by banks. This system was central to the Crisis and a
primary beneficiary of the Fed's LOLR operations."12 Moreover, while
this system shrank immediately following the Crisis, it regained its status
as equal in size to the U.S. banking system and it is poised for yet further
growth.' 1
3
Information, or rather lack of it, is central to the systemic risk that
arises from shadow banking. A core regulatory challenge posed by shadow
banking is the rise of information gaps-that is, pockets of pertinent and
theoretically knowable information not known to any market participant
or regulator.' 14 Information gaps are endemic to shadow banking because
a significant portion of the capital flowing into the shadow banking system
comes from the issuance of money-like claims that are designed to obviate
the need for the holder to do any meaningful due diligence about the
value of the underlying assets or the associated risks.' 15 At the same time,
because this regime operates in the capital markets and thus outside the
direct purview of the Fed and other prudential regulators, regulators often
know even less than market participants about matters like the quality of
the underlying assets and how the institutional arrangements that
constitute the system redistribute risks and create new interconnections.
The close examination of the first year of the Crisis provides additional
evidence of these dynamics and the ways that information gaps can
inhibit both the market and regulatory responses required to help
restore stability once panic takes hold." 6 It also highlights why the Fed
and other regulators will always have an incomplete understanding of
how risks are allocated and the transmission mechanisms through which
problems can spread, as the very process of regulating incentivizes
112. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Some
Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy Response (Apr. 13, 2012), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20l20413a.htm [http://perma.cc/
7AKH-JGPX] (stating "a number of the vulnerabilities" at heart of the Crisis "were associated
with the increased importance of the so-called shadow banking system"); see also supra section
I.B (discussing Fed's provision of liquidity to nonbanks during Crisis).
113. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural Address
for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 Rev.
Banking & Fin. L. 619, 620 (2012) (noting "shadow banking has... grown rapidly"
between 2008 and 2011); Fin. Stability Bd., Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report
2014, at 8-9 (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/_141030.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6QBR-E7A6] (reporting shadow banking assets as share of GDP rose by "6
percentage points to 120% of GDP in 2013, approaching the peak of 124% of GDP in
2007").
114. See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 5-6 (describing why information
gaps are endemic to shadow banking as currently constituted).
115. Id.
116. See infra Part III (providing numerous examples of how lack of information
inhibited market functioning and capacity of regulators to respond in timely and
appropriate way as events unfolded).
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market participants to find new ways to undertake economically equi-
valent activity in less regulated domains."
17
In short, in both the United States and abroad, central banks have
always played a lead role in crisis management. Even post-Crisis, the Fed
retains complete control over monetary policy, which is often the most
powerful tool available to combat a growing financial crisis.1 t 8 The Fed
alone also retains control over the provision of liquidity, the other
primary tool traditionally used to prevent and contain financial crises."l 9
And other elements of the Dodd-Frank Act, like Congress's decision to
have the Fed oversee nonbank systemically important institutions, affirm
the expectation that the Fed will continue to play a lead role in
addressing systemic threats. 12 The creation of the FSOC and the OFR
alter the overall landscape in material ways, and Fed policymakers will
need to work closely with both organizations in the course of their efforts
to contain future financial crises. Nonetheless, the Fed remains at the
forefront of crisis management, and crisis management requires high-
quality information that the Fed will often lack when a crisis first strikes.
Updating the paradigm for how the Fed can best use its LOLR authority
and expecting the Fed to serve as an information-coordination agent
during periods of systemic distress will enable the Fed to execute its
established roles more effectively than it currently does and enhance the
capacity of the overall financial regulatory regime to contain nascent
financial crises.
The final point to highlight is that in arguing that the Fed should at
times extract information from banks and other financial institutions in
exchange for the largesse of timely access to cheap liquidity, this Essay
embraces a very thick notion of information generation. This can go
beyond demanding data, to asking market participants to produce infor-
mation they might not otherwise possess and potentially even seconding
personnel to the Fed to enhance the Fed's ability to analyze the infor-
mation it has received. Given that part of the challenge will be that
relevant information is dispersed across market participants and regu-
lators in ways that inhibit anyone from having the comprehensive view
necessary to make informed decisions, the claim here is that the Fed
should prioritize both information extraction and production as among
the aims it can legitimately seek to achieve using its LOLR authority.
117. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 10, 17 (noting "regulatory arbitrage is endemic" to
modem societies).
118. E.g., Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, Illiquid Banks, Financial
Stability, and Interest Rate Policy, 120 J. Pol. Econ. 552, 583 (2012) (showing "why the
structure of banks may necessitate ex post interest rate intervention").
119. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Ben S. Bernanke, The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis 3
(2013) (stating key function of Fed is "to keep the financial system working normally and,
in particular[] ... to either prevent or mitigate financial panics or financial crises").
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2. Information Injections. - Information is just as important to
market participants as it is to regulators. Market participants rationally
hesitate to enter into a transaction when they lack information about the
creditworthiness of counterparties, the value of collateral, or other
considerations relevant to the amount and nature of the risk that the
transaction poses, and the terms of the transaction do not compensate
them accordingly. These dynamics play a significant role in contributing
to systemic risk. Bad news signaling that missing information may be
important is often the immediate trigger of a financial crisis.12 ' This is
just as true in the shadow banking system as it is in the banking system. 122
While market participants generally, and money claimants in particular,
may be quite comfortable relying on imperfect but probative indicia of
asset quality and related matters during periods of widespread confi-
dence, that inclination can change quickly in the face of any indication
that the proxies market participants had relied on are less reliable than
previously believed. 123
Put differently, a lack of liquidity will often serve as a flag that
market participants are unwilling to trade because they lack the infor-
mation they need to understand and price the risks to which they will be
exposed. Depending on their incentives and how costly it is for them to
privately produce that information, ignorance on the part of market par-
ticipants can serve as a major impediment to the restoration of healthy
market functioning once confidence wanes. 124 Additionally, injecting
information or otherwise helping to coordinate the production and
redistribution of information to address such challenges may entail signi-
ficantly less credit risk and moral hazard than other government inter-
121. See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Stress for Success: A Review of Timothy Geithner's
Financial Crisis Memoir, 53J. Econ. Literature 975, 981 (2015) [hereinafter Gorton, Stress
for Success] (contending we can understand financial crises as situations "where
conditional on a public shock.., debt [which had been information insensitive] becomes
information-sensitive," giving rise to "adverse selection or the fear of adverse selection");
see also Mishkin, Remarks, supra note 65 (defining systemic risk as "risk of a sudden,
usually unexpected, disruption of information flows in financial markets that prevents
them from channeling funds to those who have the most productive profit
opportunities").
122. See e.g., Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 41-45 and sources cited
therein (discussing evidence of mass exits by money claimants in shadow banking system
during Crisis, which occurred when "bad news was coupled with new information
suggesting that the proxies money claimants had relied on were less accurate than
previously believed").
123. See Judge, Fragmentation Nodes, supra note 99, at 697 ("When a signal conveys
new information suggesting that an investor has dramatically underappreciated the nature
or magnitude of a risk to which he is exposed... the investor is likely to exercise
significantly greater caution in assessing and taking actions in response to other possible
risks as well.").
124. See Judge, Information Gaps, supra note 41, at 33-36 ("[I]t is costly to produce
information and, when those costs are high because gaps are large, this can result in
significant frictions limiting the capacity of market participants and regulators to respond
in a timely and proportionate fashion to certain types of new information.").
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ventions to help restore stability, while still helping to promote that aim.
Helping market participants to produce pertinent information and over-
come frictions is thus one way that the Fed can fulfill its role as
information-coordination agent and help restore stability during periods
of systemic distress.
3. Bank Health. - Another common reason for persistent liquidity
problems is that banks or other financial institutions lack sufficient
capital in light of the risks to which they are exposed. Liquidity shortages
only arise when market participants are hesitant to work with one
another or hesitant to accept collateral on terms equivalent to those they
had previously been willing to offer. Information-related frictions can
aggravate and give rise to such problems. But when market participants
remain hesitant, it will often indicate that they have legitimate concerns
about the health of other financial institutions or the value of the col-
lateral they can post. Given the inherent staleness of the measures reg-
ulators typically use to monitor bank health, these indications are ones
that the Fed and other regulators should take seriously. And because the
Fed's role as the LOLR means it will likely end up exposed to precisely
those financial institutions and collateral that the market is questioning,
regardless of whether the Fed otherwise oversees those institutions, the
Fed ought to be at the forefront of efforts to identify capital shortfalls
and other financial weaknesses.
History has shown that bank regulators and other government actors
often delay acknowledging and addressing weaknesses in the health of
financial institutions, and that such delays typically cause the situation to
deteriorate further and often increase the cost of the ultimate cleanup. 25
The Fed's LOLR authority is not the optimal tool for addressing capital
weaknesses. Once the Fed identifies areas of concern, it will often need
to work with the FSOC, other regulators, or Congress to gather further
information and address any identified capital deficiencies. Failures to
correct shortfalls thus cannot and should not be laid entirely at the Fed's
door. Nonetheless, identifying capital shortfalls and working with other
policymakers as needed to address those shortfalls in a timely fashion is
entirely consistent with roles that the Fed has long played and remains
uniquely well suited to play.
III. THE CRISIS
For the sake of analysis, the Crisis can be divided into four chapters:
(1) the buildup, (2) the slow decline, (3) life support, and (4) recovery.
During the buildup, the period leading up to August 2007, the ground-
work for the Crisis was laid: housing prices soared; subprime loans
proliferated; securitization vehicles, backed by subprime loans and other
125. The savings and loan debacle is the most famous example of these phenomena,
but the analysis here reveals that similar dynamics were at play during the Crisis.
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assets, flourished; other elements of the shadow banking system similarly
grew; and financial institutions became increasingly leveraged and
increasingly reliant on wholesale financing. There was increasing
evidence of problems in the housing market and declining demand for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) starting in 2006. Nonetheless, it was
not until August 2007,126 when BNP Paribas announced that it was
halting redemptions in three funds because a lack of liquidity prevented
it from being able to accurately price certain MBS in those funds, 127 that
systematic ramifications of these developments were on full display. The
period from August 2007 through September 2008 marked the slow
decline. Immediately following the failure of Lehman Brothers, starting
with the government's provision of $85 billion for insurance giant AIG,
was the period of life support. In the months that followed, the govern-
ment effectively backstopped every critical element of the banking and
shadow banking system.' 28 To do this, regulators became increasingly
creative in how they used the powers available to them,' 29 sought addi-
tional authority from Congress, 3 ' and then became even more creative
and aggressive in how they used their expanded authority. 13 1 This
stabilized markets, but it did so primarily by allowing market participants
to rely on the creditworthiness of the government in lieu of frank assess-
ments of counterparty risk and asset values. This period gradually
transitioned into the final chapter, a period of recovery during which
market participants became increasingly willing to work with one another
126. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., I I0th Cong. 148 (2007) (statement of Vickie A. Tillman, Executive
Vice President, Standard & Poor's Credit Market Services) (testifying as to role of S&P
Ratings services following "unprecedented conditions in the subprime mortgage market
and the credit crunch and pressure on the economy that have followed").
127. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
128. See Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, supra note 41, at 2 (noting emergency
liquidity facilities "amounted to functional backstops of... the [entire] credit inter-
mediation process that runs through the shadow banking system... [w]hile today's
traditional banking system was made safe and stable through the deposit insurance and
liquidity provision provided by the public sector").
129. See infra section III.D.2 (discussing Fed tactics in handling AIG crisis).
130. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1145, 122
Stat. 2654, 2734 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012)) (providing Treasury
Secretary with power to place Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)into receivership
or conservatorship); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §115,
122 Stat. 3765, 3780 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2012)) (providing Treasury
Secretary with authority to acquire up to $700 billion of distressed assets).
131. For example, preferred shares in relatively healthy banks and unhealthy automakers
were deemed to be "troubled assets," and thus could be acquired using funds that Congress
had made available based on the expectation they would be used to buy MBS and other
"toxic" assets. See, e.g., Neil KingJr. &John D. Stoll, U.S. Offers $5 Billion to Car Suppliers,
Wall St. J. (Mar. 20, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB123747406976485103 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting automaker bailout
was funded through Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)).
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directly and the financial system regained its capacity to function without
widespread government support.
Each period of the Crisis, from the buildup to the recovery, is
potentially relevant to this project. The types of life support required, for
example, reveal systemic fragilities that potentially could have been
identified and treated earlier. Similarly, the conditions that enabled life
support to be withdrawn shed light on the types of government inter-
ventions that proved most enduring. Yet accounts of the Crisis are fre-
quently hundreds of pages long, and even then are truncated versions of
all that occurred. 132 A comprehensive analysis is thus beyond the scope of
this Essay.
This Part addresses the space constraints in a few ways. First, the
analysis proceeds chronologically, but its focus is on the slow decline,
that is, after the crisis was underway but before the disastrous events of
September 2008. Second, the analysis focuses on episodes that are parti-
cularly important or illustrative with respect to the dynamics here at
issue. Within these episodes, the analysis is structured in accordance with
the aims of information gathering, information dissemination, and asses-
sing bank health. The goal is to consider whether, in light of what Fed
officials knew at various junctures, they might have made different deci-
sions had their actions been guided by the proposed paradigm for how a
LOLR should respond during periods of prolonged market dysfunction.
The third way the scope is rendered manageable is by focusing
primarily on the lead up to two of the most important developments in
the Crisis: the failure of Lehman Brothers and the Fed's rescue of AIG.
Lehman's bankruptcy filing had massive ripple effects, triggering adverse
developments throughout the financial system, and has been identified
by many as the most significant regulatory failure of the Crisis.'33 It thus
played a critical role, accentuating the magnitude of the Crisis and the
Great Recession that followed. AIG's near failure was critical. As one
commentator noted at the time, the initial $85 billion facility the Fed
instituted to save AIG was "the most radical intervention in private busi-
132. E.g., Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011)
(spanning 633 pages); Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises
(2014) (spanning 580 pages); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop
the Collapse of the Global Financial System (2011) (spanning 512 pages); Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to
Save the Financial System-and Themselves (2009) (spanning 600 pages).
133. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism 274 (2009) [hereinafter
Posner, Failure of Capitalism] ("decid[ing] to allow Lehman to slip into bankruptcy...
looms as the single biggest blunder" during the Crisis); Gorton, Stress for Success, supra
note 121, at 2 ("Clearly, the results of the Lehman bankruptcy were devastating."). But see
David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its
(Unintended) Consequences 23-31 (2010) (suggesting Lehman's failure was not as
pivotal as some suggest).
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ness in the central bank's history."'13 4 The implicit policy of too-big-to-fail
reified by this action gave rise to significant moral hazard and associated
market distortions-shielding systemically important firms from market
discipline, enabling them to access funding on excessively favorable
terms, and incenting financial institutions to alter their profiles in ways
that increase the likelihood that they too will be perceived as too
systemically significant to fail. It also led to a range of costly reforms
designed to counter this moral hazard.135 And it exposed the Fed to sig-
nificant credit risk, as Fed policymakers had limited information about
AIG's financial health when they extended this support." 6 Hence, if the
Fed, on its own or with the aid of other actors, could have done more to
avert or minimize the ramifications of either of these developments, the
course of the Crisis, the legislative response to it, and the amount of
credit -risk and moral hazard arising from the government's interventions
might have been very different.
A final background note: Because the aim of this Part is to consider
what was known or realistically knowable by policymakers, it relies heavily
on primary materials to reconstruct these dynamics in real time. One
limitation inherent in this approach is that the most comprehensive con-
temporaneous materials consist of transcripts of FOMC meetings. Com-
posed of all members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
(the Board) and five presidents of regional reserve banks, the FOMC is
primarily responsible for setting monetary policy and overseeing OMOs
whereas the Board and regional banks play a greater role in establishing
and implementing LOLR operations. Nonetheless, the transcripts
remain highly relevant, as financial stability is critical to the FOMC's
capacity to fulfill its mandate and the transcripts provide valuable insights
into the understandings and perceptions of FOMC members, which also
informed the actions they took as members of the Board and presidents.
A. August 2007: The Start
The event that precipitated the start of the Crisis was the
announcement by BNP Paribas that it was suspending redemptions in
134. Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed's $85
Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
09/17/business/17insure.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
135. See, e.g., U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-14-809T, Testimony Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Prot. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, Large Bank Holding Companies: Expectations of Government Support 2
(statement of Lawrance L. Evans, Jr., Director, Financial Markets and Community
Investment, U.S. Gov't Accountability Off.) (2014) (stating empirical analysis and inter-
views suggest "recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood
the federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding
companies").
136. See infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text (noting policymakers' contem-
poraneous acknowledgement that Fed lacked critical information when rescuing AG).
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three of its funds because the lack of liquidity in the market for subprime
MBS prevented it from being able to value the assets the funds held.'3 7
The market contraction that followed was sufficiently severe that the
European Central Bank (ECB) immediately injected an additional 95
137. See Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response,
and the Work Ahead 90 (2013) ("The system began to crack inJuly 2007" but "[t]he real
wake-up call didn't come until August 9, 2007. ... "); Paulson, supra note 132, at 61 ("The
crisis in the financial markets I had anticipated hit with force on August 9, 2007."); Viral V.
Acharya & Matthew P. Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 Critical Rev. 195, 208
(2009) (describing BNP Paribas announcement on August 9, 2007 as "next wave of the
crisis"); Gara Afonso, Anna Kovner & Antoinette Schoar, Stressed, Not Frozen: The
Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis 2-3, 9 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep.
No. 437, May 2011) (finding liquidity hoarding beginning after August 2007 and referring
to "2007-2008 Crisis"); Markus K Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit
Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. Econ. Pers. 77, 82-86 (2009) (describing troubling indicators
throughout summer of 2007 and shift that followed BNP's announcement); Michael J.
Fleming, Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, at
1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 563, 2012) ("The Federal Reserve...
undertook numerous measures to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis that started in
August 2007."); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on
Repo, 104J. Fin. Econ. 425, 426 (2012) (referring to "financial crisis that began in August
2007"); MarkJickling, Cong. Research Serv., R40173, Causes of the Financial Crisis (2010)
("The current financial crisis began in August 2007 ..."); Alberto Manconi, Massimo
Massa & Ayako Yasuda, The Role of Institutional Investors in Propagating the Crisis of
2007-2008, 104J. Fin. Econ. 491, 491 (2012) ("By August 2007, what had begun as some
bad news about the souring of the subprime mortgage market had spread into a full-
fledged financial crisis encompassing wide-ranging and seemingly unrelated markets.");
Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, supra note 41, at 59 (noting "liquidity crisis began in
August 2007"); Alexander Chudik & Marcel Fratzscher, Liquidity, Risk and Global
Transmission of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis and the 2010-11 Sovereign Debt Crisis 2
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Working Paper No. 107, 2012),
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0107.pdf [http://
perma.cc/J7BA-9PK5] (describing August 2007 as "onset of the global financial crisis");
Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis 5
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16609, 2010), https://
www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/fmishkin/papers/nberwp.wl6609.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NNV2-967Z] ("Lehman was going to extraordinary efforts.., to hide its leverage, even
after the financial crisis started in August 2007."); Jill Treanor, Credit Crunch Pinpointed
to 9 August 2007-The Day the World Changed, Guardian (Dec. 1, 2011, 3:49 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/201 1/dec/01/credit-cr-unch-pinpointed-august-
2007 [http://perma.cc/CG4L-2DG7] (pinpointing "start of the first credit crunch as 9
August 2007"); Unhappy Birthday, Economist: Schumpeter (Aug. 9, 2012, 1:40 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/08/financial-crisis [http://
perma.cc/P638-B7X2] ("There is a debate to be had over when precisely the financial
crisis began. But five years ago today, on August 9th 2007, is the strongest candidate.").
The transcripts from the FOMC meeting on August 7, 2007, reveal that Fed policymakers were
attuned to liquidity shortages in these markets and the potential for those shortages to disrupt
the functioning of key markets. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on August 7,
2007, at 16-17 (statement of William Dudley) [hereinafter August 7, 2007 FOMC Meeting],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20070807meeting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5GST-3JBU]. Nonetheless, the BNP Paribas announcement and the market
disruptions that followed provided regulators and market participants significant new
information about the magnitude of the disruptions that could result.
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billion Euro into the financial system. Soon thereafter, the ECB made
additional liquidity injections and other central banks, including the Fed,
intervened to support market functioning. 3 ' The August and September
meetings of the FOMC address these developments and what Fed policy-
makers learned from them.
1. Extracting Information. - Within a week of the BNP Paribas
announcement, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke recognized that the dys-
function observable in the markets could trigger a "downward spiral...
that could threaten or harm the economy" and that the Fed should
respond accordingly.'3 9 As Bernanke noted, the possible responses
consisted of "something in monetary policy, something in our lender-of-
last-resort function, or some combination.' 4 0 After debating the options,
the FOMC decided to bolster its LOLR operations by making loans
extended through the discount window more attractive to banks.' 4' The
Committee favored such an approach because lowering the fed funds
rate-the primary tool for monetary policy-was viewed as a "blunter
instrument." 14 2
By September, most Fed policymakers recognized that the previous
month had revealed significant weaknesses in the financial markets, and
many also believed that the possibility of an extremely bad outcome had
increased. 143 According to Governor Frederic Mishkin, " [T]he downside
risk is actually very, very substantial. Though we may not be allowed to
138. See, e.g., Mauro F. Guillen, Lauder Inst., Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., The Global
Economic & Financial Crisis: A Timeline 1, http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/ChronologyEconomic FinancialCrisis.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5ZG8-WHVT] (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) ("Thursday, August 9,
2007:... The European Central Bank pumps €95bn (£63bn) into the banking market to
try to improve liquidity. It adds a further C108.7bn over the next few days. The US Federal
Reserve, the Bank of Canada and the Bank ofiapan also begin to intervene.").
139. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Aug. 16, 2007, at 3
(statement of Ben Bernanke), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMC20070816confcall.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MH5-MPRH] [hereinafter August 16,
2007 FOMC Conference Call].
140. Id. at 7 (statement of Ben Bernanke).
141. Officially this decision was implemented by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, which comprises a subset of the FOMC. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee on September 18, 2007,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20070918.htm [http://perma.cc/8CEP-
MBNP] ("Simultaneously [with the FOMC decision], the Federal Reserve Board
announced that, to promote the restoration of orderly conditions in financial markets, it
had approved a 50 basis point reduction in the primary credit rate .... ").
142. See August 16, 2007 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 139, at 28 (statement of
Richard Fisher); see also id. at 6 (statement of Ben Bernanke) (noting "rate cut is not
completely off the table, but my own feeling is that we should try to resist a rate cut until it
is really very clear from economic data and other information that it is needed").
143. See, e.g., September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting, supra note 67, at 83 (statement of
Randall Kroszner) ("I agree with virtually everyone around the table that some of the
downside risks have increased, and it's important to think about them in terms not just of
the overall average but of tail risks.").
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mention it in public, we have to mention the 'R' word because there is
now a significant probability of recession."144 Fed President Janet Yellen
similarly expressed "concern[] about the asymmetric nature of the risks
that we face and the possibility of ... nonlinear, negative dynamics."'45
Fed policymakers had also become attuned to the possibility that
seemingly minor developments could have significant and surprising
effects. As Governor Kroszner noted: "We saw that what really initiated
things.., was BNP Paribas's announcement .... [I]t would have been
hard to know that it would have the kind of effect that it seemed to have
of leading to a revaluation of risks not just in the subprime sector but
much more broadly." 4 6 He also specifically recognized that because of
changes in the financial markets, the Fed lacked critical information:
In the old days, we used to know where the risks were;
unfortunately, we knew that they were all on the bank balance
sheets. With the originate-to-distribute model and securiti-
zations, we have been able to move to a different model in
which the risks are much more dispersed .... [S]ome of them
are certainly going to be coming onto the bank balance sheets,
so the banks never fully get out of this. But it leads to potential
pockets of uncertainty, and that is exactly what has come up.'47
Yet, Fed policymakers seemed reluctant to use the Fed's LOLR
authority to inquire into the actual health of financial institutions. For
example, in explaining why he favored a more modest reduction in the
interest rate for discount window loans, Governor Donald Kohn explained
that such an approach would "help[] [the Fed] maintain" the status of the
discount window as a "no questions asked" facility, that is, as a facility that
qualifying banks could access without having their financial health
scrutinized. 4 ' And, in his view, it was "really important to maintain" that
policy. 4
9
2. Disseminating Information. - Even prior to the BNP
announcement, Fed policymakers were aware that the markets for
subprime mortgages and securities backed by them were "significantly
impaired."'5 ° Fed policymakers were also aware that the problems in the
subprime market were adversely affecting corporate debt markets despite
144. Id. at 90 (statement of Frederic Mishkin). All titles refer to the position held at
the time the words were spoken. Governors are members of the Board; presidents are the
heads of the regional Reserve Banks.
145. Id. at 112 (statement ofJanetYellen).
146. Id. at 83-84 (statement of Randall Kroszner).
147. Id. at 86 (statement of Randall Kroszner).
148. August 16, 2007 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 139, at 12 (statement of
Donald Kohn).
149. Id. at 26 (statement of Donald Kohn).
150. August 7, 2007 FOMC Meeting, supra note 137, at 6 (statement of William
Dudley).
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"the disparity in fundamentals between these two sectors." 15' As William
Dudley, who oversaw the Fed's OMO, explained to the Committee, the
primary factor that seemed to be driving this unexpected contagion was
that "[t]here has been a loss of confidence among investors in their
ability to assess the value of and risks associated with structured products,
which has led to a sharp drop in demand for such products."
52
By September, the market appeared to be in the grips of a process of
trying to re-evaluate the risks associated with a wide variety of structured
assets and the exposures of financial institutions to those assets. As
Timothy Geithner, President of the New York Fed and Vice President of
the Committee, explained: "The process of differentiation among strong
and weak institutions, conduits, financing vehicles, et cetera has to con-
tinue. But as many of you said, this process could take quite some time,
and it will leave us with the risk of a fair amount of fragility in markets in
the interim."' 3 Kohn echoed these sentiments, noting that "[a] critical
channel of contagion that came into play in the intermeeting period was
the involvement of the banks as providers of credit and liquidity
backstops in the [asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)] market"
which caused "uncertainties about real estate markets, the performance
of nonprime mortgages, and structured-credit products [to come] to rest
as greater uncertainty about bank exposures. "154 It thus appeared to Fed
policymakers that a lack of credible information about the value of
structured products and financial institutions' exposures to those pro-
ducts were significant factors inhibiting market functioning.
Moreover, Fed policymakers recognized even at this stage that for
markets to recover, market participants required information. As
Kroszner explained:
People don't have as much information as they thought they
had. They were relying on traditional rating agencies and on
other sources that were perfectly fine for traditional credits but
more of a challenge for the newer credits [like structured
financial products] .... They are now going to have to invest
much more in getting that information.'
Mishkin similarly observed: "Of course, the big problem is really the
issue of information revelation and price discovery." 156 Interestingly,
there was even some acknowledgment that it may be appropriate for the
Fed to play a role in this process. President Jeffrey Lacker, for example,
suggested that, "if we really think information constraints are at the heart
151. Id. at 8 (statement of William Dudley).
152. Id. (statement of William Dudley).
153. September 18, 2007 FOMC Meeting, supra note 67, at 74 (statement of Timothy
Geithner).
154. Id. at 74-75 (statement of Donald Kohn).
155. Id. at 86-87 (statement of Randall Kroszner).
156. Id. at 103 (statement of Frederic Mishkin).
[Vol. 116:843
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
of the problem, it might be better to address this problem by addressing
those constraints directly."' 5 7 He specifically proposed having the Fed
"us[e] [its] supervisory authority to encourage and facilitate greater
transparency.' ' 158 It was not an option the Fed pursued at the time.
3. Bank Health. - At this stage, there appear to have been relatively
few concerns about the financial health of banks in general, primarily
because most financial institutions appeared to have strong capital ratios,
but there were some exceptions. Governor Kevin Warsh, for example,
noted that "when we look at these financial institutions, we are probably
more prudent to judge them by their actions rather than what these
capital ratios would suggest. Their actions are still not ebullient. Their
actions are still not overly opportunistic."'' 59 Others expressed similar
sentiments, suggesting that while banks appeared very well capitalized
and capable of withstanding the adverse developments, there were
reasons for concern. 160
It was also clear that many large financial institutions were facing a
number of challenges that could adversely affect their financial health.
Market conditions prevented banks from being able to retain securitized
loans they had originated with that intent and limited their capacity to
replace short-term "bridge" loans with longer-term syndicated loans.
Both of these developments and the increasing utilization of outstanding
credit lines had the effect of tying up more capital than banks had anti-
cipated.' 6' The most significant and troubling development with respect to
bank health, however, was the discovery that many banks had very signi-
ficant contingent, and sometimes implicit, liabilities that had not been
reflected on their balance sheets, raising questions about the accuracy and
completeness of those balance sheets.
B. January 2008: The First Intermeeting Rate Cut
By January, it had become clear that the challenging market con-
ditions were likely to persist for some time and conditions could get sub-
stantially worse. As Bernanke explained: "The thrust that I got [from
conversations with bankers] was that things are going to be pretty
157. Id. at 145 (statement ofJeffrey Lacker).
158. Id. (statement ofJeffrey Lacker).
159. Id. at 79 (statement of Kevin Warsh).
160. For example, at the September 18 meeting William Dudley assessed that:
The general sense is that U.S. banks are very healthy and.., well capitalized.
However.... [t]he problem they have right now is that they can't really size
with any accuracy how much will be coming onto their balance sheets over
the next few months through asset-backed commercial paper, through bank
conduits, and through other things for which they may be on the hook that
they didn't expect to be on the hook for.
Id. at 11.
161. Id. at 4 (statement of William Dudley).
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tight .... As one banker put it in our meeting, 'There is no Plan B." ' 1 6 2
In other words, the possibility acknowledged in August of a further
downward spiral in the financial markets, with significant and deleterious
effects on the real economy, appeared even more likely in January.
Reflecting the magnitude of concern about this risk, the FOMC lowered
the fed funds rate by 75 basis points to 3.5% on January 22, in a rare
intermeeting action; and it lowered the rate an additional 50 basis points,
to 3%, at its regularly scheduled meeting on January 30. This section
considers the rationales underlying those cuts and the implications for
this Essay's claims. The section closes by exploring the challenges of
using monetary policy to respond to adverse developments in the fin-
ancial markets and why it may be valuable for the Fed to have more fine-
tuned instruments to address such developments.
1. Extracting Information. - In proposing the initial rate cut,
Bernanke explained that he was troubled by the conditions of the
financial markets. As he noted, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff
had recently circulated a paper "which compares some indicators of our
economy with other major financial crises and finds that we rank at the
moment among the five largest financial crises in any industrial country
since World War II.' 113 In addition to recognizing that the country
already appeared to be in the midst of a significant financial crisis, many
Fed policymakers remained concerned that conditions could get
substantially worse. Mishkin, for example, emphasized that:
[T] here really is potential for a negative feedback loop that has
not yet set in. The financial disruption that we're seeing right
now could then mean a more substantial worsening of the
aggregate economy, and that could make the financial markets
have even more strain .... So I really worry about the downside
risks and think that they are very substantial .... 14
Others expressed related concerns about the course the Crisis was
taking.'65 Fed policymakers were thus confronting the challenge of how
162. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Jan. 9, 2008, at 17
(statement of Ben Bernanke), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMC20080109confcall.pdf [http://perma.cc/2R2D-NDME].
163. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on Jan. 21, 2008, at
8 (statement of Ben Bernanke) (emphasis added) [hereinafter January 21, 2008
FOMC Conference Call], http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
FOMC20080121confcall.pdf [http://perma.cc/N897-5CNV].
164. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Jan. 29-30, 2008, at 94
(statement of Frederic Mishkin) [hereinafter January 29-30, 2008 FOMC Meeting],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080130meeting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F3A7-PKT9]; see also id. at 81 (statement of Timothy Geithner)
(explaining how adverse feedback loop could develop).
165. See, e.g., id. at 83 (statement of Donald Kohn) ("To me one of the defining
characteristics of the period since, say, mid-November is the spreading out from the
housing sector of lending caution to other sectors in the economy.").
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best to contain what appeared to be a significant and growing financial
crisis.
The magnitude of the perceived threat is reflected both in the
Committee's willingness to approve a rare and controversial intermeeting
rate cut and in the aggregate size of the two cuts authorized. President
Thomas Hoenig, for example, repeatedly noted that he was "troubled"
by the cut, but willing to support it because "[i]t is a very daunting
thought to think about a crisis that you might have avoided had you just
taken certain actions." 166
There was also increasing appreciation that the Fed lacked the infor-
mation and understanding it needed to face the challenges ahead. As
Kroszner observed, "it is hard for me to really understand exactly what
drove the ... deterioration" at the end of 2007.167 In his view, until the
Fed understood the reasons why conditions were continuing to
deteriorate, it had little hope of successfully combatting those
dynamics. 168
The specific challenges plaguing the financial markets in January
also shed light on some of the factors contributing to the system's
fragility, factors which the Fed should potentially have known more about
than it did.169 One of the most pressing challenges was the deteriorating
financial health of the monoline insurers-insurance companies that
traditionally specialized in insuring municipal bonds but also had insured
many AAA-rated MBS and other ABS. As Dudley explained, the leading
monoline insurers had recently had their credit ratings downgraded and
further downgrades were expected.1 7 0 This posed a number of challenges,
primarily because many of the MBS, other ABS, and related assets held by
banks were insured, and when the companies providing that insurance
were downgraded, the banks had to mark down the value of those assets
accordingly.'7
1
These developments thus brought to the fore many of the dynamics
that contributed to AIG's near failure. It alerted the Fed to the mag-
nitude of the interconnections between banks and insurance companies
166. January 21, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 163, at 14-15 (statement of
Thomas Hoenig).
167. January 29-30, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 164, at 90 (statement of Randall
Kroszner).
168. See id. (statement of Randall Kroszner) ("I'm concerned that, since I don't really
understand what happened there, I don't want to take too much comfort from what has
happened so far.").
169. See infra section III.B.2 (assessing Fed's awareness of systemic weaknesses and
informational uncertainty).
170. January 21, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 163, at 4 (statement of
William Dudley).
171. Id. at 5 (statement of William Dudley). Insurance companies typically recognize
losses on insurance policies only as they are incurred, so the net effect is to accelerate
recognition of these losses.
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and to the role of insurance policies (and economically similar arrange-
ments) covering MBS and related products in creating those exposures.
It also highlighted the potential for a rating downgrade of an insurance
company to wreak havoc on banks for reasons apart from the actual
financial health of the insurance company. Perhaps most importantly,
these developments alerted the Fed to how little monitoring there often
was of the risk exposures of insurance companies generally. As Geithner
explained: "We have had extensive conversations with the New York State
Insurance Commissioner, who is the lead supervisor of many of them"
and "[i]t turns out that office ... has very little information, particularly
on the stuff that is on the leading edge of concern, which is to whom
they sold credit protection and on what."'172 Dudley also noted that
"there's quite a bit of cloudiness about what their true condition is." '73
The Fed also had a much more robust picture of what went wrong in
August 2007. The FOMC's regularly scheduled January meeting included
a "special presentation on policy issues raised by [the] financial crisis, '"174
including a "diagnosis" which suggested that the two most important
contributing factors were: "(1) a loss of investor confidence in the ratings
of structured-finance products and [ABCP], which caused structured-
credit markets to seize up and ABCP markets to contract, and (2) the
resulting losses and balance sheet pressures on financial intermediaries,
especially many of the largest global financial services organizations."' 17
5
Other evidence suggested these challenges persisted and were continuing
to contribute to the ongoing market dysfunction.
The staff presentation on the Crisis also provided information from
a study conducted in conjunction with the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), the primary supervisor of all national banks, and
the SEC, which ran the Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Program,
through which it had supervisory authority over the five leading invest-
ment banks. The study examined the quality of risk management at large
financial institutions, and it revealed a very mixed bag. Some firms
appeared to have robust and effective risk-management systems; others
did not. The study found that the "less effective" firms "operated with
more limited liquidity and capital buffers"; "did not have limit structures
that were consistently or effectively enforced"; "did not properly aggre-
gate or monitor off-balance sheet exposures across the organization";
"were siloed... and were comparatively slower in taking actions to
mitigate exposures"; had thought less "about the interplay of their risk
measures"; had less "timely and scalable management information
systems"; were less "disciplined in how they valued the holdings of
172. January 29-30 FOMC Meeting, supra note 164, at 17 (statement of Timothy
Geithner).
173. Id. at 18 (statement of William Dudley).
174. Id. at 158 (statement of Ben Bernanke).
175. Id. at 159 (statement of Patrick Parkinson).
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complex or potentially illiquid securities"; "relied heavily on third-party
views of risk"; and "tended to have a narrower view of the risks associated
with their CDO business. "
'176
In other words, there were massive deficiencies in the risk-
management systems of some major financial institutions, limiting their
capacity to understand, much less manage, their risk exposures.
2. Disseminating Information. - In addition to recognizing that
conditions seemed to be getting worse rather than better, Fed policy-
makers recognized that informational dynamics continued to be a signi-
ficant factor contributing to that decline. As Geithner noted: "There
[remains] a huge amount of uncertainty about the size and the location
of remaining credit losses across the system.""'7 Kohn similarly observed:
"The extraordinary volatility in markets is, I think, indicative of under-
lying uncertainty, and that underlying uncertainty itself will discourage
risk-taking."' 78 He further highlighted that "[tihe monoline issue raises
questions about who will bear the losses [stemming from the declining
housing prices] and provides another channel for problems spreading
through the credit markets."79 And, as just discussed, the Fed staff also
presented new analyses regarding the dynamics that had contributed to
the liquidity crunch that occurred in August, which emphasized the role
that uncertainty played in contributing to it. By January 2008, it was thus
plain that a lack of information persisted, with respect to both the value of
MBS and other securitized assets and the impact of potential losses on
those assets upon the health of major financial institutions. It was also clear
that this dynamic was contributing to, and could significantly aggravate,
market dysfunction.
3. Bank Health. - By January, some Fed policymakers had become
quite concerned about the financial health of banks generally. A presen-
tation by Fed staff showed that the largest banks remained "well-
capitalized," as that term was defined under the then-prevailing statutory
scheme, but there had "been significant erosion of their capital ratios
over the past two quarters. '"180 It was thus evident that the developments
in the financial markets and the declining value of certain assets were
having significant and adverse effects on bank balance sheets.
Continuing a theme from August, some questioned how much
comfort regulators should take from banks' supposedly adequate capita-
lization ratios. Warsh, for example, believed that "financial institutions as a
group are.., undercapitalized, even with the recent capital infusions."' 8'
He further observed: "Income statement shortfalls due to falling profits,
176. Id. at 184-86 (statement ofJon Greelee).
177. Id. at 81 (statement of Timothy Geithner).
178. Id. at 84 (statement of Donald Kohn).
179. Id. (statement of Donald Kohn).
180. Id. at 8 (statement of William Dudley).
181. Id. at 86 (statement of Kevin Warsh).
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poor visibility, weaker pipelines, and the need to reduce headcounts very
meaningfully strike me in some ways as a more urgent and troublesome
issue for large financial institutions than their balance sheet weaknesses"
and while "the window for foreign investment is open now, I wouldn't
expect that window to stay open throughout 2008."182 Warsh was thus
questioning not only bank health but also the adequacy of the information
the Fed possessed and relied on to assess bank health, suggesting instead
that a more forward-looking approach might be more informative.
Warsh also identified one of the core challenges underlying the
problems that had already surfaced and that would give rise to those that
lay ahead. As he explained, large financial "institutions have been built,
or should I say rebuilt, over the past six years to prepare themselves for a
low volatility, high liquidity world, and what they found is the exact
opposite."'183 He thus recognized that both their balance sheets and
business models were designed to maximize profits in a world that no
longer existed and would not return. Moreover, "[t]hey are at different
levels of understanding the new world"-some get it, some do not-"and
it will take.., time to rebuild their businesses to be profitable in it."' 84 In
short, at least some policymakers believed that financial institutions were
in real trouble and that those troubles were likely to get worse before
they got better. They also recognized that some institutions were in denial
regarding the challenges they faced, and that while institutions could raise
the new capital they would need to survive the transition in the current
environment, they likely needed to do so quickly.
Others raised similar concerns and made other suggestions
regarding the type of information that the Fed might want from banks.
President Eric Rosengren, for example, raised concerns about the ade-
quacy of banks' risk-management systems. He observed:
[A] horizontal stress review was done about a year ago ....
When they did that stress testing, what was striking was that
there were four institutions-I think it was Citigroup,JPMorgan
Chase, Wachovia, and Bank of America... and all four
concluded that a housing-price reduction of between 10
percent and 20 percent would affect earnings but wouldn't
affect capital. Obviously, in retrospect that doesn't seem to have
been a good forecast.
18 5
He also recommended going back and repeating the exercise, both
because it would be helpful for the institutions and because "[federal
182. Id. at 87 (statement of Kevin Warsh). This approach to assessing the health of
large financial institutions was central to the stress tests, which proved critical in helping to
restore market functioning. See infra notes 303-312 (exploring purposes and effects of
Fed's stress-testing regime).
183. January 29-30, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 164, at 87 (statement of Kevin
Warsh).
184. Id. (statement of Kevin Warsh).
185. Id. at 189 (statement of Eric Rosengren).
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policymakers would] learn something about how they're thinking about
housing prices and the indirect effects that might occur because one of
our concerns.., is that there may be unintended consequences if housing
prices drop more than they have historically.' 1 86 This not only functions as
a reminder that horizontal stress tests were a tool that the Fed and other
bank supervisors had been using for some time, but it also reveals that as
early as January 2008, there was support for using horizontal stress tests
to provide higher quality information to both the Fed and banks about
the risks to which banks were exposed and to test banks' capacity to
accurately assess how they would fare in the face of further adverse
developments.
4. Tool Set.- The January meetings also highlight the challenge of
using monetary policy to combat the perceived threats to the financial
system. The core challenge, as articulated by staff economist Brian
Madigan, is that while "aggressive policy easing would help mitigate eco-
nomic weakness, it would also raise the risk that policy could add unduly to
inflation pressures should recessionary weakness not develop."' 87 Put
differently, by positively affecting asset prices, economic growth, and
other factors that affect the health of financial institutions and the
stability of the financial system, monetary policy can play an important
role in reducing or mitigating a nascent financial crisis. But it is a coarse
and sometimes excessively high-powered tool and there are always risks
associated with its use. Moreover, the primary risk associated with easy
money policies, inflation, was one that the FOMC felt it could not ignore.
In January, following a trend that would continue, Madigan noted that
"the inflation picture seems to have deteriorated somewhat," i.e., there
was reason for concern. 88 Many Committee members were also con-
cerned that lowering the fed funds rate between scheduled meetings
could damage the Fed's credibility, create expectations of further rate
cuts, and send a signal that the Fed was panicking.
Some members also questioned whether rate cuts would actually
reduce the risks that the Fed was seeking to contain. As Lacker noted: "I
can appreciate the possibility of financial market fragility, but I don't see
the level of the funds rate as real closely tied to conditions of fragility.""8 9
He explained: "I don't think a funds rate change is going to save the
monolines. I don't think it is going to save financial institutions from the
monolines."' 9 And, in his view, those were the core challenges. The
drawbacks with using monetary policy to address the challenges the Fed
186. Id. (statement of Eric Rosengren).
187. Id. at 103 (statement of Brian Madigan).
188. Id. at 104 (statement of Brian Madigan).
189. January 21, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 163, at 16 (statement of
Jeffrey Lacker).
190. Id. (statement ofJeffrey Lacker).
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was facing help demonstrate the value to the Fed of having more refined
tools for addressing a growing financial crisis.
C. March 2008: New Liquidity Facilities and the Failure of Bear Stearns
A critical turning point in the Crisis was the failure of Bear Stearns
in March 2008. With the help of a $29 billion backstop from the New
York Federal Reserve,' 9' Bear was acquired by J.P. Morgan rather than
filing for bankruptcy. The purchase price made all creditors whole and
ultimately provided equity holders $10 per share. 192 To ensure that the
Fed would not lose money on the backstop, and solidifying the close
working relationship between the Fed and Treasury in response to the
Crisis, the Treasury committed to making the New York Fed whole if the
collateral Bear posted proved insufficient to cover the amount owed. 193
This event was important because of the information that Bear's failure
conveyed to policyrnakers and market participants and, separately, because
the Fed's decision to help Bear avoid filing for bankruptcy implicitly
affirmed too-big-to-fail (or, more accurately, too interconnected to fail) as
a government policy. The increased expectation of government
intervention altered market activity and, presumably, should have made
it clear to Fed and other policymakers that the Fed may well provide
support to a financial institution-even one that it does not supervise
and about which it thus might have little information-if the welfare
ramifications of allowing it to fail seem sufficiently great.
It was also in March that the Fed introduced the Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF),
liquidity facilities available to the primary dealers rather than banks.'9 4 In
connection with these facilities, the Fed ultimately put small teams on-
191. The liquidity facility was adopted pursuant to section 13(3) and thus required the
approval of the Board of Governors, but not the FOMC. For more about this facility, see
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter March
16, 2008 Press Release], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
20080316a.htm [http://perma.cc/8PRJ-GYKN].
192. Landon Thomas Jr. & Eric Dash, Seeking Fast Deal, JPMorgan Quintuples Bear
Steams Bid, N.Y. Times (Mar. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/25/business/
25bear.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[The chief executive of J.P. Morgan]
agreed to pay $10 a share in stock and to purchase 95 million new shares of Bear
Stearns....").
193. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and
Maiden Lane LLC, Regulatory Reform, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_
bearstearns.htm [http://perma.cc/TVT6-KH5U] (last updated Dec. 9, 2014).
194. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve and
Other Central Banks Announce Specific Measures Designed to Address Liqtidity Pressures
in Funding Markets (Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20080311a.htm [http://perma.cc/KK5S-E9XR] (introducing TSLF);
March 16, 2008 Press Release, supra note 191 (announcing PDCF).
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site at Lehman and the other investment banks 95 and eventually entered
into an information-sharing arrangement with their primary regulator,
the SEC. 19 6 This section explores the implication of these developments,
concluding with a closer look at how the support provided by the NY Fed
altered dynamics in ways relevant to this Essay's claims.
1. Extracting Information. - The near-failure of Bear revealed that
the Fed lacked access to timely information about the health of at least
some systemically important financial institutions. It further revealed
massive deficiencies in the oversight regime then in place and cast doubt
on the SEC's capacity to understand and respond to risk-taking at the
major investment banks. At a meeting just prior to Bear's failure, the Fed
approved the TSLF, a facility that would provide loans to primary dealers,
including Bear Stearns. Nonetheless, there was but one reference to Bear
Stearns at the meeting and no discussion of its financial health. A sub-
sequent congressional hearing revealed that no federal regulator appre-
ciated the firm's "precarious health," and they learned of its intent to file
for bankruptcy only the day before the firm expected to file.'97 The event
thus revealed massive gaps in the capacity of the regime then in place to
provide financial policymakers timely and accurate information about
the financial health of the major investment banks.
Also notable, as explained by SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
shortly after Bear's failure, was that the "experience demonstrated...
that the prevailing measurements of capital and liquidity that were then
being used by the SEC and by every bank regulator... were inadequate
to prevent the 'run on the bank' that Bear endured. In just two days...,
Bear's liquidity pool fell by over 83%," and "[s]hort-term secured fin-
ancing was unavailable even when Bear offered high-quality collateral." 198
This was a development that no "regulatory approach" or "existing
regulatory model had taken into account." 199 It was thus clear that the
information that the Fed and others were relying on as prognosticators
of financial institution health failed to accurately portend probable
demise.
195. Report of Anton R. Valukas at 1495, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 469 B.R.
415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555) [hereinafter Report of Anton R. Valukas].
196. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Uuly 7, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080707a.htm
[http://perma.cc/LYX9-43G9] (announcing memorandum of understanding between
SEC and Fed).
197. Stephen Labaton, Testimony Offers Details of Bear Stearns Deal, N.Y. Times
(Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/04/business/04fed.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
198. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Address to the Security Traders 12th Annual
Washington Conference (May 7, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch
050708cc.htm [http://perma.cc/FS7N-FASE].
199. Id.
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The decision to save Bear also revealed specific information gaps
and other limitations inherent in the then-existing regulatory regime.
For example, in assessing the ramifications of allowing Bear to fail and
choosing to intervene to prevent that outcome, Fed officials were again
alerted to the critical role of interconnections among firms as a mecha-
nism through which the system could be threatened. According to the
minutes of the Board meeting approving the loan, the Board reasoned
"that, given the fragile condition of the financial markets at the time, the
prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected
contagion that would result from the immediate failure of Bear Stearns,
the best alternative available was to provide temporary emergency fin-
ancing."20 0 Bernanke similarly emphasized, when defending the action
before Congress a few weeks later, that the Fed was concerned that Bear's
"failure could.., have cast doubt on the financial positions of some of
Bear Stearns' thousands of counterparties. '20 ' This suggests that the Fed
was worried about the actual losses that Bear's failure would impose on
other financial institutions and it was concerned that even if Bear's
counterparties could handle the resulting losses, the counterparties of
Bear's counterparties may not know that, and this latter dynamic could
itself impede market functioning. 20 2
The second rationale that Bernanke emphasized in defending the
Fed's action was that "Bear Steams participated extensively in a range of
critical markets" and the Fed was concerned that "the sudden failure of
Bear Stearns likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in
those markets and could have severely shaken confidence. '"20 3 In contem-
plating the effects of allowing Bear to file for bankruptcy, the Fed thus
had become attuned to the limited capacity of the resolution regimes
then in place to facilitate an orderly liquidation of such a firm and the
potential for such a process to trigger profound and adverse ripple
effects throughout the financial system.
In addition to revealing weaknesses, the procedures the Fed
undertook in deciding to provide support to Bear also reveal significant
200. McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 647 F.3d 331, 334 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (quoting Thro Declaration Exhibit A (minutes of March 14, 2008 board
meeting)).
201. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Economic Outlook: Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress
(Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Bernanke, Economic Outlook Testimony], http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080402a.htm [http://perma.cc/JL64-
QVUW].
202. The potential for these dynamics to lead to market freezes has since been
formalized. See Ricardo J. Caballero & Alp Simsek, Fire Sales in a Model of Complexity 1-4
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15479, 2009), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w15479.pdf [http://perma.cc/99L3-DT86] (highlighting ways in
which fire sales may impede market functioning by increasing uncertainty faced by
participants in complex financial markets).
203. See Bernanke, Economic Outlook Testimony, supra note 201.
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strengths in terms of the Fed's capacity to respond creatively and aggres-
sively when it chooses to do so. The information-gathering activities the
Fed engaged in illustrate this dynamic. For example, to assess the
ramifications of Bear's failure, the Fed "surveyed those institutions subject
to the Board's regulation to assess their exposure to Bear Stearns," with
particular attention to "the exposure of large complex banking organi-
zations."2 °4 Thus it used the supervisory relationships to gather infor-
mation that was not directly relevant to the supervision, but which
allowed it to make a more informed decision with respect to another
issue the Fed was facing. This act also highlights that even financial insti-
tutions that the Fed oversaw directly-including many banks that were
using TAF as an important source of liquidity-had information that the
Fed did not otherwise regularly seek in connection with its supervisory
activities and which could have been incredibly useful to the Fed in its
efforts to manage the evolving financial crisis.
To assess and manage the credit risk inherent in providing the back-
stop supporting the acquisition, the Fed recognized that it also needed
information about the quality of the assets that Bear wanted to post as
collateral. In order to obtain this information in the limited time available,
Geithner "called Larry Fink, the CEO of the investment firm BlackRock,"
to evaluate the assets.205 The episode thus also demonstrates that the Fed
can, and during the Crisis regularly did, use outside consultants when it
needs expertise or simply greater manpower than it can muster internally.
This enables the Fed to expand its information-gathering and analyzing
capacities quite quickly when it chooses to.20
6
Other issues discussed during the March FOMC meetings further
support the notion that policymakers who subscribed to the proposed
paradigm for how a LOLR can best use that authority might have recog-
nized the importance of prioritizing information gathering and analysis.
Even prior to Bear's failure, Kroszner, for example, worried that the
TSLF "may be just another step along a path that we haven't really
204. McKinley, 647 F.3d at 334 (citing Declaration of Coryann Stefansson, Associate
Director of Board's Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation 7-8).
205. Geithner, supra note 132, at 155.
206. The Fed used outside consultants in a number of ways in connection with its
exceptional liquidity facilities. See, e.g., Office of the Inspector Gen., Lending Facilities,
supra note 48, at 24-26 (listing consulting service vendors used by Fed). More generally,
while the Fed's status as a leading bank regulator means that it will have a workforce
capable of assessing a bank's health and risk exposures, such personnel will likely be
exceptionally busy already during periods of widespread systemic distress. Relying on
outside consultants or personnel seconded from the financial institutions receiving liqui-
dity support from the Fed could allow the Fed to expand its effective workforce quickly
and might also engender greater diversity in the perspectives brought to the table, further
enhancing the Fed's capacity to identify and assess issues in a timely manner. Cf. infra
sections V.B, V.D (describing how logistical constraints and biases might limit Fed's
efficacy as information-coordination agent).
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defined well. '2°7 This concern entailed a number of distinct issues,
including concerns about a slippery slope and exit strategy, but Kroszner
was particularly concerned that the program may not be enough and
may not address the heart of the challenge. As he explained:
I don't really understand why some of the risk spreads have
blown out again in the last week or two. That doesn't mean that
we need to study it to death .... But I think we need to have a
bigger-picture view to see what is going to go next and how to
respond going forward to people who say, "Well, you've tried
five different little things, and none has really worked, or they
work as temporary palliatives." So I think we really need to
understand the origins of this better to better understand how
we can respond.208
This statement reflects an awareness of the Fed's limited
understanding of the challenges it was facing and a recognition that
without such an understanding, it was far less likely that the Fed would be
able to meaningfully address those challenges. Nonetheless, when the Fed
met later that month-after Bear had failed and the Fed had stepped in to
rescue it-there was little indication that the Fed was particularly con-
cerned with becoming better informed about the reasons for the
ongoing problems in the financial markets and how they could best
respond.
The overall tone and focus of the March meetings also suggest that
better information may have altered the Fed's focus, discussions, and
actions in productive ways. Throughout March, the appropriate fed
funds rate remained the primary topic of the discussions. While this
focus, in itself, may be explained by virtue of the FOMC's function, the
tenor of those discussions cannot be so easily dismissed. Two FOMC
members, for example, voted against the rate cut effectuated at the
March meeting.0 9 One of the dissenters noted he had some concerns
about growth, but he felt that the situation was notably less dire than
some others perceived it to be.210 At the same time, he was very
concerned about inflation, and he believed that cutting rates further
would prioritize growth over price stability, setting the stage for future
inflation. 21 Even Committee members who approved the cut spent
significant time addressing the inflationary risks, a focus that necessarily
207. March 10, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 86, at 31 (statement of
Randall Kroszner).
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Minutes of the March 18, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 49, at 7-8.
210. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Mar. 18, 2008, at 48-49
(statement of Charles Plosser) [March 18, 2008 FOMC Meeting Minutes],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080318meeting.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LXG7-PD9P] (emphasizing disparity between Fed forecasts and those
of private sector).
211. Id. at 49-51 (statement of Charles Plosser).
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diverted attention from the pending crisis and the many issues raised by
Bear's failure and salvation.
21 2
2. Disseminating Information. - Bear's near failure also held lessons
regarding market participants' lack of credible information about the
health of other financial institutions and how that lack of information
could adversely affect market functioning. As an initial matter, Bear's
demise cast doubt on the reliability of the type of information market
participants typically utilized to assess the health of a financial institution.
As Dudley explained, "[t]he disparity between [Bear's] book value
[which had been $84 per share at the end of the last fiscal year] and the
purchase price caused investors to question the accuracy of investment
banks' financial statements more generally. ' 21 3 A related challenge was
that Bear's demise appeared to be the product of a "run," as investors
and counterparties lost confidence in the firm and sought to protect
their individual interests despite the costs it might impose on the
collective. 214 The event thus revealed that even a bank that did not rely on
depositors could fail quickly and appearing to be well capitalized did not
ensure a firm would survive. 215 Additionally, as just described, the Fed's
decision to support Bear was justified in part by concerns that uncertainty
among financial counterparties about the effect that Bear's failure would
have on each other could have crippled market functioning.
21 6
The discussion at the FOMC meeting following Bear's failure
suggests that Committee members recognized that insufficient infor-
mation was contributing to systemic fragility. Charles Evans, president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, explained, "I believe our
innovative policies are helpful for facilitating market functioning, but
they don't address the root problem. Markets want a firmer sense of
where prices for stressed assets will bottom out and of the magnitude of
the portfolio losses that will be taken by major financial players." 217
Charles Plosser, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
212. See, e.g., id. at 27 (statement of Thomas Hoenig) (voting in favor of cut but
expressing concern regarding "upside risk to inflation"); id. at 31-33 (statement ofJanet
Yellen) (voting in favor of cut, but concluding statement with remarks on inflation).
213. Id. at 4 (statement of William Dudley).
214. See id. at 3 (statement of William Dudley) ("In my view, an old-fashioned bank
run is what really led to Bear Stearns's demise.").
215. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, to Nout Wellink,
Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision 3 (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-48_letter.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CM6-C9DS] (showing "until the
closing of theJP Morgan Chase transaction on Sunday March 16, Bear Steams had a capital
ratio of well in excess of the ItD% level used by the Federal Reserve Board in its 'well-
capitalized' standard"). Cox also suggested that the firm failed, in part, because
counterparties refused to work with it "[nlotwithstanding that Bear Steams continued to
have high quality collateral to provide as security for borrowings." Id.
216. See March 18, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 210, at 61 (statement of Kevin
Warsh) (noting "counterparty risk has become the dominant concern in markets").
217. Id. at 40 (statement of Charles Evans).
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similarly noted that "[u]ncertainty about valuations seems to be the root
cause of liquidity problems." 21 8 Members of the FOMC thus recognized
that liquidity was a symptom, not just a cause, of the ongoing market
dysfunction and that lack of information was a significant factor contri-
buting to the ongoing challenges.
3. Bank Health. - The FOMC transcripts also reveal that Fed
policymakers were increasingly concerned about the health of large
financial institutions. Governor Kohn, for example, explained: "I agree
with the others who say that [our innovations, while helpful] don't
directly deal with the underlying macro risk, which is really a story about
capital, solvency, wealth, and prices. '2 1 9 Governor Warsh reiterated this
concern, "highlight[ing] ... the need, across all these institutions, to
raise significant capital for safety and soundness purposes and, in
addition, for credit availability purposes" as "this broad class is systema-
tically undercapitalized. 2 1 Warsh also went further, suggesting that in
light of his assessment of the industry, he believed that the Fed should
"use all our tools to persuade them that it is in their interest and in the
interest of the broad economy for them to raise capital." 22'
To be sure, others, including Geithner, disagreed with the assess-
ment that the financial system as a whole was undercapitalized . 22 That
there were such mixed views on such a fundamental issue, however,
largely affirms why this may have been an important issue for the Fed to
investigate further.
4. Fed Interventions and Market Expectations. - The events of March
2008 also highlight the way that regulatory responses to a persistent
liquidity crisis affect the capacity of the system to withstand further adverse
developments. That government policies and actions change market
expectations is well recognized, and there is a growing appreciation of the
ways that steps the government takes seeking to mitigate a crisis can have
the counterproductive effect of making the system more fragile and the
ultimate fallout even more damaging. 223 A few dynamics merit particular
attention.
First, in choosing to save Bear, the Fed sent a strong signal that it
would not allow a firm to fail when its failure might have adverse sys-
temic repercussions and connections with other financial firms or a
218. Id. at 52 (statement of Charles Plosser); see also id. at 61 (statement of Kevin
Warsh) ("Over the past couple of weeks, not just in the episode with Bear Stearns,
counterparty risk has become the dominant concern in markets.").
219. Id. at 58 (statement of Donald Kohn).
220. Id. at 62 (statement of Kevin Warsh).
221. Id. (statement of Kevin Warsh).
222. Cf. id. at 74-75 (statement of Timothy Geithner) (arguing against ability to make
accurate judgment as to undercapitalization).
223. See, e.g., Acharya & Tuckman, supra note 73, at 2 (arguing LOLR facilities, if
poorly designed, may actually risk "reducing the extent to which financial firms delever"
and exacerbating risk of default).
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presence in critical markets might suffice as a basis for intervention.
The market responded accordingly.124 This was foreseeable and spe-
cifically acknowledged by Fed policyrnakers. As Lacker noted in May, one
drawback of having the Fed seek greater supervisory authority over
investment banks and other primary dealers is:
[It] is just going to sustain the expectations that have arisen
since Bear-which have been described and referenced a
couple of times and which you see in the fall in CDS spreads for
those institutions-and it is just really hard to see how to put
that genie back in the bottle and limit the extent to which we're
viewed as backstopping them.225
More generally, as Bernanke observed at the FOMC's June meeting
in response to apparent improvements in some indicators of systemic
distress, "I do not agree that systemic risk has gone away. I think it is in
abeyance. There is perhaps, if anything, excessive confidence in the
ability of the Fed to prevent a crisis situation from metastasizing. '2 6 By
increasing participants' estimations that the Fed would prevent a
major financial institution from failing, the action weakened market
discipline and increased the likelihood that market participants would
be ill-prepared should a systemically significant firm actually file for
bankruptcy.2 27
A related challenge is that the signal was sent not only to
counterparties of major financial institutions, but also to the executives
making decisions on behalf of those institutions. Richard Fuld, Lehman's
CEO, has said that he never thought that the government would allow
Lehman to fail. 228 Similarly, SEC Chairman Cox has suggested that
"people would have behaved differently if they were not expecting the
government to do something," and their capacity to do so would have
been aided significantly if that "message could have been provided...
224. See James R. Barth et al., The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Mortgage and Credit
Markets 119 fig.4.13 (2009) (showing CDS spreads for financial firms fell significantly
when Fed intervened to support Bear Stearns).
225. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 166 (statement of Jeffrey
Lacker).
226. Id. at 133 (statement of Ben Bernanke).
227. Cf. Skeel, supra note 133, at 31-33 ("The prospect of bankruptcy at the end of
the line would discourage excessive risk taking in the first instance, encourage creditors to
monitor, and if dark clouds did develop, spur managers to make plans for an orderly
bankruptcy."). This phenomenon has arisen in an array of contexts and is a well-
recognized cost of bailouts. See, e.g., Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Isabel Schnabel & Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test 5 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 02/181, 2002) (examining Russian crisis and determining
expectation of IMF bailout created moral hazard problem).
228. Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 195, at 1506.
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more than a week before" Lehman's demise.22 9 It thus appears that the
Fed's rescue of Bear not only sent a signal to the market that it would
likely find a way to prevent Lehman from failing, it also altered the way
that executives at Lehman assessed their options and reduced their sense
of urgency. 2
30
Through the two liquidity facilities for primary dealers, the Fed
further contributed to Lehman's fragility and its capacity to delay making
difficult decisions. As Geithner acknowledged in June, "[0] ur facilities
by design should allow them [the investment banks] to run with a mix of
leverage and liquidity risk that is above what the market probably now
would permit. In the absence of our facilities, leverage and liquidity
risk... would have to be lower.... "231 This flexibility was particularly
important to Lehman's ongoing survival during this period. As Dudley
explained, also in June:
There were a number of people to whom we talked who said
that the reason they stayed with Lehman during this period of
stress was that they knew that the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
was there as a backstop. So I have a high degree of confidence
that Lehman would have been in great difficulty without it.2 3 2
These developments were not viewed, at the time, as solely
problematic. Allowing financial institutions to delever more slowly than
they otherwise would was one aim of the temporary facilities and may
have been helpful in averting fire sales. Nonetheless, it is clear that Fed
officials knew that their programs enabled Lehman to remain more highly
levered and less liquid than the market would otherwise allow, rendering
Lehman more vulnerable to adverse shocks.2 33 These indirect means of
support are critical, as Lehman may have had better options if the market
had forced it to make difficult decisions earlier than September. 234 Even
according to Lehman's own overly rosy assessments, the firm lost nearly $7
billion in just the second and third quarters of 2008, far more than it
raised during the period. 2 5
229. Abigail Field, Lehman Report: Why the U.S. Balked at Bailing Out Lehman,
DailyFinance (Mar. 15, 2010 8:47 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/03/15/why-
th e-u-s-balked-at-bailout-out-leh man/ [http://perma.cc/QUH4-S452].
230. See infra section IV.B (addressing whether Fed could have credibly conveyed
such a message and types of actions Lehman could have taken if it had been convinced).
231. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 153-54 (statement of
Timothy Geithner).
232. Id. at 155-56 (statement of William Dudley) (emphasis added).
233. See Acharya & Tuckman, supra note 73, at 22, 26-29 (analyzing Lehman's
illiquid leverage throughout 2007 and 2008).
234. See, e.g., Geithner, supra note 132, at 207 (explaining Lehman "had chased the
boom far too long" and citing as example that "as late as May 2007," when PDCF was in
place, Lehman "led financing for a wildly overpriced $22 billion acquisition").
235. See Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 4 (July 10,
2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/806085/000110465908045115/
a08181471 10q.htm [http://perma.cc/3Q9K-U9CJ] (showing loss of $2.873 billion in
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A final issue is that Bear's failure could have triggered legal reforms,
which would have significantly affected subsequent developments. Shortly
after Bear's failure, the Chairman of the SEC, the one agency with
oversight responsibility for the investment banks, recognized the insuf-
ficiency of the current regime and the need for greater regulation.
236
Some in Congress seemed to agree and also appeared open to suggestions
for how the regulatory structure should be changed to address gaps
revealed by Bear's near failure.237 Nonetheless, no Fed or Treasury
officials pushed for immediate reform, and no changes were enacted
along these lines.
D. Summer 2008
Nearly six months passed between March 2008, when the Fed bailed
out Bear Stearns and adopted facilities available to primary dealers, and
the developments of September 2008, which triggered the nadir of the
Crisis and expanded the scope of the government safety net through the
extension of its implicit too-big-to-fail policy.238 There are numerous signs
suggesting that during this period, financial policymakers were excep-
tionally concerned about the health of the financial system and the
potential for the situation to deteriorate further. As Geithner describes in
his autobiography: "I felt like I was watching a disaster unfold in slow
motion, with no ability to prevent it and weak tools to limit the damage." 239
Some regulators also started to engage in contingency planning should
second quarter of 2008); Riley McDermid & Steve Gelsi, Lehman to Post $2.8 billion
Quarterly Loss, MarketWatch Uune 9, 2008, 4:38 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/lehman-brothers-to-raise-6-billion-in-capital-shares-plunge [http://perma.cc/
7TDV-XS5N] (reporting Lehman's plan to raise $6 billion in capital to offset loss and
continuing damage inflicted by credit crunch). To understand the critical role the
Fed played in allowing this to happen, see infra Part III.D.1.
236. Cox, supra note 198 ("[T]he framework of federal financial services
regulation... is dangerously behind the times.").
237. See, e.g., Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Recent Actions of
Federal Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong. 94 (2008) (prepared statement of Sen. Tim Johnson) ("I look
forward to the regulators and other panelists suggestions on what Congress can and
should do .. "); id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Richard C. Shelby) ("[I]t would be unwise if
we did not take this opportunity.. . to thoroughly examine what transpired, including
how Bear Stearns was regulated, what caused its collapse, whether any other institutions
face similar risk, and if there are any shortcomings in our regulatory structure."); see also
Jed Graham, Paulson Urges Broad Rethinking of Rules as Investment Banks Tap Discount
Funds, Investor's Bus. Daily, 2008 WLNR 5774642 (Mar. 27, 2008) (quoting House
Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank as saying "investment banks should
be subject 'to the same type of prudential supervision that now applies only to banks"').
238. The most significant regulatory development during this period was the adoption
of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which, among other things, provided
the Treasury the authority that it eventually used to place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
into receivership. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
§ 1145, 122 Stat. 2654, 2734 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2012)).
239. Geithner, supra note 132, at 173.
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conditions deteriorate further. It was during this period, for example, that
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson and his staff devised the blueprint
for the subsequently adopted Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP),
which initially entailed a proposal for the government to spend up to $500
billion to acquire MBS and other illiquid assets. 2 4
0
In many ways, what is most notable about this period, however, is not
what happened but what did not, particularly considering the lessons
reflected in and arising from the near failure of Bear. Rather than
canvassing all that happened and could have happened over the course
of these six months or engaging in a detailed analysis of FOMC meeting
transcripts, which reflect many of the same concerns identified during
the first seven months of the Crisis, this section focuses on issues that
proved particularly pivotal-the financial health of Lehman and AIG and
the systemic ramifications of allowing either to fail.
1. Lehman. - According to Geithner, one of the most pressing
challenges facing the Fed during this period was that the Fed "had only
limited tools to defend against a run on firms outside the commercial
banking system, at a time when running seemed increasingly rational."241
The failure of Bear Stearns had vividly demonstrated just how quickly an
investment bank, even one that was seemingly well capitalized, could fail
if counterparties refused to work with it, and it illustrated that counter-
parties might run more quickly than previously appreciated. Both regu-
lators and market participants viewed Lehman as the next most vul-
nerable of the investment banks.242 This section considers, in turn, the
Fed's monitoring of Lehman and the planning it undertook in anti-
cipation of its possible failure.
2. Increased but Still Limited Monitoring. - Starting in March 2008,
the Fed invoked a right to know more about the financial health of the
investment banks and other primary dealers as a condition for standing
ready to lend. Notably, while some Fed policymakers questioned whether
the Fed should demand information from investment banks in con-
nection with the adoption of the TSLF, the first facility to provide credit
to primary dealers, Geithner downplayed the Fed's capacity to use its
status as creditor to demand information or impose other conditions on
240. Sorkin, supra note 132, at 83-93.
241. Geithner, supra note 132, at 173.
242. See, e.g., Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 195, at 1491 ("At the time of
Bear Stearns' near collapse ... [it was] thought at the highest levels of every relevant
Government agency that Lehman could be the next investment bank to fail."); Landon
Thomas Jr., Aftershocks of a Collapse, With a Bank at the Epicenter, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/20O8/O3/18/business/18bear.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) ("'And then we're hoping that Lehman won't go under because
then there will be way too many bankers looking for jobs."' (quoting anonymous
investment banker)).
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eligible institutions.243 Nonetheless, by the time he wrote his autobio-
graphy, he recalled that starting in March, he took the position that, "[i]f
[the investment banks] were going to enjoy access to Fed liquidity, we
needed to understand and limit the risks they were taking" which meant
"climb[ing] inside the investment banks" and not "rely[ing] on the SEC
anymore. '244 And the Fed did demand greater information in
connection with its adoption of its second facility for primary dealers, the
PDCF.
For the next six months, the Fed engaged in a monitoring program
that focused "primarily, but not exclusively, on [the] four [largest]
investment banks." 245 As explained by the Fed staff in ajune presentation
to the FOMC: "Our effort does not stem from our general supervisory
examination authority. ' 2 46 Rather, they sought "to exercise informed
judgment about the capital and liquidity positions of the primary dealers
that have access to the PDCF" and "to, in shorthand, mitigate the moral
hazard that accompanies the creation of the PDCF in particular. '247
There is no indication that any of the primary dealers, including the
investment banks, in any way challenged or protested the authority of the
Fed to engage in additional monitoring; nor is there any sign that any
stigma resulted from the heightened scrutiny.
The scope of these operations was "fairly narrow,"" focusing almost
exclusively on capital and liquidity. The staffing seems to have been
correspondingly modest, with "several 2 49 New York Fed staff on-site at
Lehman and with the overall operations supported by only a "small off-
site staff."250 The limited scope of the Fed's investigatory efforts is
reflected in the amount of information the Fed did not possess about
Lehman until after its bankruptcy. Perhaps the most famous of Lehman's
efforts to disguise its actual financial health was its Repo 105 program,
which enabled the firm to appear less leveraged than it actually was in its
public financial statements.25' Because the transactions were specifically
taken with the aim of distorting the accuracy of the company's public
filings and misleading counterparties and investors who relied on those
243. See March 10, 2008 FOMC Conference Call, supra note 86, at 17 (statement of
Timothy Geithner) ("We do not have the capacity... to redesign the regulatory
framework to give us, as a condition of access to something that we are doing for market
functioning, the ability to affect and constrain the risktaking behavior of those
institutions.").
244. Geithner, supra note 132, at 162.
245. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 138 (statement of Art
Angulo).
246. Id. at 139 (statement of Art Angulo).
247. Id. (statement of Art Angulo).
248. Id. (statement of Art Angulo).
249. Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 195 at 1469.
250. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 139 (statement of Art
Angulo).
251. Report ofAnton R. Valukas, supra note 195, at 6.
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filings, they are precisely the type of transactions that it is most important
for regulators with inside access to detect. 252 Yet the Fed's monitoring was
sufficiently limited that it had no knowledge of these transactions until
much later.
25 3
The FOMC discussed the limited scope of the Fed's monitoring
activities at its June 2008 meeting. Art Angulo, who led the presentation,
explained that the New York Fed was monitoring investment banks'
capital, but "we know from examining banks that a capital number that's
reported to you depends on how you're carrying your assets" and, "we're
basically taking the inputs.., at face value and not doing our own work
to try to validate those. ' 254 This was true even though there had been
numerous questions raised about the values Lehman was placing on its
assets and despite the lessons learned (and capabilities demonstrated) in
connection with the Bear episode.255 Angulo further acknowledged, " [W] e
have not really looked to a consolidated assessment of risk management
at these firms, something we do in the bank supervision process."
256
Significantly, Angulo suggested that the Fed should consider more
rigorous oversight. As he explained to the Committee, "[S] ix months or
a year from now, I think it's going to be very difficult to say that we're just
doing this liquidity and capital thing. People are going to want to know a
litde more about our judgments and how we made those judgments 257
and "there's some risk to making those judgments without having a little
more information. So I think.., if we have our traditional bank super-
vision model on the left and what we're doing right now on the right, we
252. David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New
Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 152, 164 (2012) (describing "now-infamous
Repo 105 transactions that Lehman employed at the end of each quarter to disguise the
amount of its leverage").
253. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Lessons
from the Failure of Lehman Brothers: Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.
(2011) [hereinafter Bernanke, Lessons], http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20100420a.htm [http://perma.cc/9LUS-WSA6] ("The Federal
Reserve was not aware that Lehman was using so-called Repo 105 transactions to manage
its balance sheet.").
254. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 148 (statement of Art
Angulo).
255. See Geithner, supra note 132, at 165 ("The markets could see that Lehman was
carrying assets at 80 or 90 cents on the dollar that other firms had written way down.");
Louise Story, Lehman Battles an Insurgent Investor, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/business/041ehman.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (explaining hedge fund manager David Einhorn was betting against
Lehman and had raised questions regarding "how the company valued the assets on its
books, and whether it was disclosing all the risks it faces").
256. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 148 (statement of Art
Angulo).
257. Id. at 143 (statement of Art Angulo).
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have to move this way, more to the left. '258 There is no indication that
such a move was subsequently undertaken.
This failure is all the more surprising in light of what the Fed did
learn about Lehman from its limited information-gathering activities.2 59
Exercising its authority as a potential creditor, the Fed forced Lehman
and the other investment banks to assess how they would perform if
subject to a run comparable to that Bear Stearns had faced. Those assess-
ments, conducted in May 2008, revealed that none of the investment
banks would survive such a run.260 In the face of those findings, the Fed
does not appear to have taken any steps, either directly or in conjunction
with the SEC, to ensure the firms increased their liquidity provisions or
otherwise enhanced their resilience. Instead, the Fed weakened the
test.26' Even this "Bear-lite" scenario did not look good for Lehman. The
NY Fed found that "Lehman would need $84 billion in additional
liquidity to survive a severe run," akin to that faced by Bear, and would
require "$15 billion to survive a somewhat less severe run. ' 262 In short,
absent significant government support, it was clear that Lehman would
fail in the face of a run. More generally, as Bernanke testified, "[T] he
information [the Fed] obtained suggested that the capital and liquidity
of the firm were seriously deficient. 
263
There were also numerous indications that Lehman failed to
comprehend the nature and magnitude of the challenges it was facing
and was excessively hesitant to raise new capital.26 For example, when
Lehman ran its own test to assess how the firm would fare under the
Bear-line scenario, "Lehman's risk managers.., concluded they would
weather the storm with $13 billion in cash to spare." 265
3. Understanding the Risks. - The other issue critical to the analysis
here is whether Fed policymakers had the information necessary to assess
the ramifications of a Lehman bankruptcy. Here, the transcripts of a
conference call among members of the FOMC on September 16, 2008, the
day after Lehman failed, are telling. By the time of the call, numerous
indicators-including the stock market, interbank lending rates, and
258. Id. (statement of Art Angulo).
259. Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra not 195, at 1495-96 (explaining on-site team
"received real-time data on Lehman's liquidity and capital position[s] through formal and
informal channels at the firm, and synthesized this data in comprehensive daily reports
distributed throughout the [New York Fed]").
260. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 141 (statement of Art
Angulo).
261. Id. (statement of ArtAngulo).
262. Geithner, supra note 132, at 165.
263. Bernanke, Lessons, supra note 253.
264. In his autobiography, Paulson describes his efforts to encourage Richard Fuld,
Lehman's CEO, to seek additional funding and Fuld's hesitance to do so. Paulson, supra
note 132, at 124, 137.
265. Geithner, supra note 132, at 165.
2016]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
Treasury yields-indicated significant market strain, so one would expect
that even Committee members who underestimated the negative rami-
fications of Lehman's failure would have already revised their expectations
downward. 66 Nonetheless, many remained relatively undisturbed by the
bankruptcy.
The views ofJames Bullard, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, while rosier than some, were not atypical. In arguing against
the need to cut the fed funds rate, he acknowledged that "[f]inancial
market turmoil is certainly a key concern," but he then emphasized that
"the U.S. economy still outperformed expectations in the first half of
2008, despite the demise of Bear Stearns-an event" that, in his view, was
"not too different in some respects from the current episode. ' 267 He
proceeded to note: "My sense is that three large uncertainties looming
over the economy have now been resolved-the GSEs and the fates of
Lehman and Merrill Lynch .... Normally, the elimination of key uncer-
tainties is a plus for the economy." 26" And he said that a "positive"
dimension to denying funding support to Lehman or potential acquirers
was that "the Fed has begun to reestablish the idea that markets should
not expect help at each difficult juncture. '269 Based on this analysis, he
was of the view that the Fed should "wait for some time to assess the
impact of the Lehman bankruptcy filing, if any, on the national
economy" rather than "react[ing] too hastily to a fluid situation."270 With
the benefit of hindsight, Bernanke has acknowledged that Fed policy-
makers had a "range of views" about the likely impact of Lehman's
failure, and yet the actual ramifications were "worse than almost anybody
expected. ' 271 Both the variations in their assessments and the magnitude
of the disparity between any of those assessments and what came to pass
suggest the Fed policymakers lacked the information they needed to
make the best decisions under the circumstances.
266. For a summary of the adverse developments already observable and clearly presented
to members of the FOMC, see Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Meeting on Sept. 16,
2008, at 4 (statement of William Dudley) [hereinafter September 16, 2008 FOMC Meeting],
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080916meeting.pdf
[http://penna.cc/2U6C-K8QR].
267. Id. at 35 (statement ofJames Bullard).
268. Id. (statement of James Bullard). The GSEs had been placed into a government
conservatorship and Bank of America had agreed to acquire Merrill Lynch. Fed. Hous. and
Fin. Auth., FHFA as Conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, http://www.fhfa.gov/
Conservatorship/pages/history-of-fan nie-mae-freddie-conservatorships.aspx [http://
perma.cc/88P8-GYBE] (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for
Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/
business/15lehman.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
269. September 16, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 266, at 36 (statement of James
Bullard).
270. Id. (statement ofJames Bullard) (emphasis added).
271. Report of Anton R. Valukas, supra note 195228, at 1505 (quoting Bernanke).
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It is also possible to identify specific deficiencies in the information
matrix available to Fed officials in deciding to allow Lehman to fail. For
example, interconnections among different markets and market actors
played a critical role in contributing to market dysfunction throughout
the Crisis, and in saving Bear, the Fed seemed concerned about these
dynamics.272 Having recognized the importance of interconnections to
assessing the systemic ramifications of allowing an institution to fail, the
Fed could have sought information about other financial institutions'
exposures to Lehman. Similarly, having recognized that an institution's
presence in particular markets could also be a mechanism of systemically
troubling contagion, the Fed could have sought to identify critical
markets which may be adversely affected should Lehman fail. Yet, based
upon the information reviewed, there is little indication the Fed made
any effort to gather such information. There are also signs that even after
Lehman's failure, the Fed dramatically underestimated the nature and
size of credit exposures among financial institutions.2 7 3 It thus appears
that additional information about Lehman's exposures, how financial
institutions might respond to its failure, and the ramifications of its
failures on particular markets may have altered Fed policyrnakers' assess-
ments of the ramifications of allowing Lehman to fail.
4. AIG. - The day after Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the Fed, with
support from Treasury, committed to providing AIG $85 billion in
liquidity support, without which it too would have filed for bankruptcy.
27 4
At the time the liquidity facility was created, Fed policymakers knew little
about AIG. Geithner, for example, has said that up until the weekend
before the Fed made that commitment, he had "very little knowledge
about the company" and he had more interactions with AIG than any
other leading Fed policymaker. 27 5 Because of this limited knowledge, he
272. See supra section III.C.
273. For example, in 2012, the Fed proposed a rule that would limit interbank credit
exposures among the largest financial institutions to 10% of an institution's regulatory
capital. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012). In response, the industry
presented evidence that typical interbank exposures were often far in excess of the proposed
rnle, and the Fed's subsequent failure to finalize the rule suggests it failed to understand this
when it made the proposal. The Clearing House, Single Counterparty Credit Limits: The
Clearing House Industry Study (July 2012), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/
Files/Association%20Documents/20120719.pdf [http://perma.cc/98RP-SMA3].
274. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm
[http://perma.cc/T2PW-MB8J]. For a thorough summary of the government's evolving
support for AIG, see Regulatory Reform: American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane
II and III, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform.aig.htm [http://perma.cc/
2FRG-KMRZ] (last updated Dec. 9, 2014).
275. Geithner, supra note 132, at 184. There is evidence suggesting that some New
York Fed employees had been making some efforts to monitor AIG's health and had even
sought information from potential counterparties about their exposures to the subsidiary
that sank AIG, AIGFP, starting in August 2008. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts at
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"thought we were taking enormous, unprecedented risks and that there
was substantial risk that we would lose billions of dollars, if not tens of
billions of dollars. ' 27 6 As with Lehman, Geithner (and others) have
explained their ignorance on the basis that "the Fed had no authority or
responsibility to supervise insurance companies.' 277 This section con-
siders whether there was information available to the Fed suggesting that
it should have sought to learn more about AIG earlier than it did and
some of the ramifications of its failure to do so.
AIG's liquidity crisis was triggered by collateral calls from financial
institutions that were counterparties to credit-default swaps (CDS)
pursuant to which an AIG subsidiary had effectively insured the perfor-
mance of MBS and similar instruments and exposures. 27" AIG's senior
management was aware that the company might face crippling liquidity
demands and that the firm had alerted the New York Fed to this possi-
bility months before these events came to pass. As Geithner recounts, "In
July, [AIG CEO] Bob Willumstad had visited the Fed and danced around
the issue of whether we might be able to help if AIG's liquidity ever dried
up. 279 After one of these meetings, some members of the New York Fed
staff had met with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)-AIG's
primary bank regulator-"to discuss MG," and, in Geithner's own
telling, the staff at the meeting "had come away alarmed. '20 Fed
policymakers also knew from other recent experiences that the OTS had
regularly failed to detect problems and control risk taking at banks it
oversaw and that the OTS had failed to communicate new and relevant
46-49, Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (Feb. 19, 2015) (No. 11-00779C).
Yet, the evidence also reveals that neither Geithner nor other senior Fed officials were
aware of these developments. Id. at 48.
276. James B. Stewart, Solvency, Lost in the Fog at the Fed, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11 /08/business/the-feds-ambiguous-definition-of-
solvency.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
277. Geithner, supra note 132, at 184.
278. Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central
Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, Wall St. J., http://online.wsj.com/articles/
SB122156561931242905 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Sept. 16,
2008, 11:59 PM); Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, Wash.
Post (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/
12/30/AR2008123003431.html [http://perma.cc/CK97-VKPD].
279. Geithner, supra note 132, at 176; see also Defendant's Statement of Contested
Facts at 12, Starr Int'l Co., 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (No. 11-00779C) (recognizing "Geithner...
met with... AIG's CEO[] twice in July 2008").
According to Willumstud, he told [Geithner] I had been doing some
planning and doing some stress testing of AIG's portfolios, and one of
the conclusions I came to is if there were a liquidity crisis, particularly in
the securities lending program, that that would require a lot of liquidity
in a short period of time, potentially, and I thought that the New York
Fed would be able to provide some support in that area.
Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Facts at 54, Starr Int'l Co., 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (No. 11-
00889C).
280. Geithner, supra note 132, at 184.
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information to the Fed in a timely manner.28 1 The Fed thus had been
alerted to the possibility that AIG might face a situation where it would
not have the liquidity it needed to continue operations without govern-
ment support, and it had little reason to have faith that the insurance or
bank regulators with primary responsibility for AIG understood the risks
to which the firm was exposed.
The Fed was also on notice that if AIG ran out of liquidity, the
systemic ramifications might be sufficiently severe that the Fed would feel
obliged to intervene to avert such an outcome. As reflected in the con-
cerns about the monoline insurers, Fed officials had been alerted to the
high degree of connectedness between insurance companies and other
financial institutions and that insurance policies and credit default swaps
(that operated like insurance) were an important mechanism of inter-
connection. Moreover, in connection with alerting the Fed to its liquidity
risk, AIG had also attempted to communicate to the Fed just how
interconnected it was. In July, Willumstad presented Geithner with
information about AIG's sizeable connections with Wall Street firms.
2 82
Additionally, Fed officials continued to recognize that interconnections
could be a basis for intervention. As Lacker noted at the FOMC's June
meeting in discussing the support the Fed has provided to Bear: "I think
it's likely that any other institution that presents the same threat of a
disorderly resolution is going to be perceived as benefiting from our
implicit lending support, whether or not they're a primary dealer, unless
we say something otherwise, unless we draw a boundary, and unless we
make that credible. 2 8 3 Lacker even identified "insurance companies" as
among the types of firms that "could easily fail in a disruptive way. ,284
The Fed did not have oversight authority over AIG, but there were a
number of mechanisms through which the Fed could have learned more
about the situations that might cause the firm to face a liquidity crunch
and the ramifications if it did. Given that the CEO had come to the Fed
on multiple occasions exploring the idea of government support, it is
possible that AIG might have provided such information had it been
asked.2 8 5 Separately, the Fed could have used its LOLR authority to gather
significant additional information about AIG's exposures. AIG's key
281. Transcript of the Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Conference Call on July 24, 2008, at
23-26 (statement of Janet Yellen), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
files/FOMC20080724confcall.pdf [https://www.per-ma.cc/8T9R-ALLW] (describing OTS
shortcomings revealed in connection with failure of IndyMac).
282. Sorkin, supra note 132, at 210-11.
283. June 24-25, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 50, at 165 (statement of Jeffrey
Lacker).
284. Id. (statement ofJeffrey Lacker).
285. This is not unprecedented. Hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM), for example, willingly opened its books to Fed officials even though the Fed had
no oversight over LTCM and, contrary to AIG, LTCM had not sought support directly
from the Fed. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 78, at 183, 186.
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counterparties were virtually all banks or other financial institutions with
access to the Fed's liquidity facilities. Goldman Sachs, for example, was one
of AIG's most significant counterparties, and it was collateral calls by
Goldman that played a critical role in draining AIG of the liquidity it
needed to operate without government support.2 6 The Fed had an on-site
team at Goldman and was already demanding that Goldman provide its
nonpublic information in connection with its eligibility to use the PDCF
and TSLF. Foreign banks, many of whom were the leading users of the
TAF, also had significant counterparty exposures to AIG. 28 7 Thus, had the
Fed chosen to use its LOLR authority to generate information, it likely
could have collected a significant body of information about AIG's expo-
sures, the liquidity demands it could face, and other matters pertinent to
AIG's financial health and the ramifications of allowing it to fail.
The incredibly limited information the Fed had about AIG is critical
to understanding the nature and magnitude of the risks the Fed assumed
when it committed to bail out AIG. With the benefit of hindsight, we
know that AIG was facing a liquidity crisis and was otherwise a solvent
institution. This has significantly enhanced the government's capacity to
extricate itself from AIG and to make (rather than lose) money on its
investment.28 8 But in assessing that decision, it is important to recognize
that this was far from clear at the time the New York Fed committed to
providing the liquidity required to save AIG. As Dudley acknowledged at
an FOMC meeting on September 16, the day that the Fed made that
commitment, "a lot of times when people look closer at the books they
find out that the liquidity crisis may also be a solvency issue" and "it is
still a little unclear whether AIG's problems are confined just to liquidity.
It also may be an issue of how much this company is really worth. 2 9
Geithner similarly has acknowledged that "[i]f AIG had been forced to
mark all its assets to their depressed market prices during a selling frenzy,
then sure, it would've been insolvent."2 He has further explained, "we
286. Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp, Goldman Fueled AIG Gambles, Wall St. J.,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424052748704201404574590453176996032
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Dec. 12, 2009, 12:01 AM).
287. Sorkin, supra note 132, at 162.
288. For a summary of the specific investments the government made to support AIG
and the financial returns on those investments, see U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Investment in
AIG, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig/Pages/
status.aspx [http://perma.cc/4DX2-AC78] (last updated Dec. 11, 2013, 5:09 PM).
289. September 16, 2008 FOMC Meeting, supra note 266, at 5 (statement of William
Dudley). The government has actually highlighted the Fed's ignorance regarding AIG in
defending the terms of the loan it ultimately provided. See, e.g., Defendant's Statement of
Contested Facts at 20, Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428 (Aug. 18, 2014)
(No. 11-00779C) (recognizing "[the New York Fed], and therefore ultimately taxpayers,
took on significant credit risk given the size of the loan, the Federal Reserve's prior
unfamiliarity with AIG, and the uncertainty of the Federal Reserve's information about
AIG's solvency, financial condition, and funding needs").
290. Geithner, supra note 132, at 206.
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thought that once the crisis passed ... there was a reasonable chance AIG's
assets would be worth more than its liabilities.
291
Also noteworthy is that without the adverse effects rippling from
Lehman's failure, it cannot be assumed that the Fed and other policy-
makers would have coalesced around the idea that AIG should receive
government support. Even without Lehman's failure, AIG's exposures
might well have put it in a position where, absent government support, it
could not have avoided filing for bankruptcy. In that event, the Fed
would have to choose between the moral hazard and other risks inherent
in providing support and the adverse systemic ramifications of allowing
AIG to fail. The quality of the decision Fed policymakers could make,
and the magnitude of the risks of intervening, depended in significant
part on the Fed's capacity to estimate the costs of allowing AIG to fail.
Information available to the Fed's policymakers reveals that the Fed's
lack of knowledge about AIG's interconnections, activities, and solvency
may have resulted in the Fed erring in its assessment of the ramifications
and perhaps taking a different course than it did. It is thus entirely
possible that under slightly different circumstances, AIG would have
been forced to file for bankruptcy, giving rise to adverse systemic
repercussions that may well have surpassed those triggered by Lehman's
failure.
E. Easing Away from the Full Backstop
The role of the government only increased following the initial
liquidity injection into AIG. With the adoption of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) on October 3, 2008,
Congress provided financial regulators with significant additional tools
and resources to support the financial system, while also seeking to hold
regulators accountable for their actions.29 2 The centerpiece of EESA,
TARP, authorized the Treasury Secretary to spend up to $700 billion to
purchase distressed assets, largely based on the plan conceived over the
summer by Paulson's aides. In light of operational challenges, a desire to
move more quickly than that plan could be implemented, and other
factors, the Treasury redirected those funds, using them instead to inject
capital directly into banks and certain other firms.29 ' That policymakers
291. Id. (emphasis added).
292. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5202, 5211-5241 (2012)).
293. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Bank Investment Programs, http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc/QP6Z-W6HB] (last updatedJan. 13, 2016
12:17 PM) (describing TARP program). While structurally this program was quite different
than the plan to buy troubled assets, it served similar aims. First, it improved the financial
viability of banks receiving the funds by ensuring that they had the capital necessary to
endure additional losses. Second, it sent a clear signal to the market that the government
would stand behind the banks receiving the funds.
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failed to realize prior to the passage of EESA that buying distressed assets
was not the best response, combined with other dimensions of how
policymakers handled that process-like the "infamous three-page"
version of the original TARP proposal, which in addition to being incre-
dibly bare bones also sought to shield the program from any meaningful
oversight-raised questions about whether leading policymakers were
prepared for and able to handle the challenges they were facing.
294
Other programs further expanded the scope of government support.
The Treasury guaranteed all money market mutual funds.295 The Fed
created a number of additional liquidity facilities 29 6 and, throughout this
period and for years to follow, adopted an exceptionally accommodative
and increasingly creative approach to monetary policy. 29v The Federal
Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) increased its level of coverage
from $100,000 to $250,000 per eligible account type,2 98 insured deposits
in excess of $250,000 if held in noninterest-bearing transaction accounts,
and guaranteed banks' issuance of certain long-term debt.299 By using
government backstops to reduce effective uncertainty and the ramifica-
tions of information gaps, these programs had a significant and bene-
ficial effect on financial activity.
294. Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial
Crisis, 25J. Econ. Pers. 49, 54 (2011) [hereinafter Mishkin, Over the Cliff]; see also id. at
55 (noting "although markets had been watching government agencies scramble to deal
with the financial crisis since late 2007, the events of September 2008 raised serious doubts
that the U.S. government had the capability to manage the crisis").
295. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hpl 161 .aspx [http://perma.cc/
3PC2-KLAW] ("The U.S. Treasury will guarantee the share price of any publicly offered
eligible money market mutual fund-both retail and institutional-that applies for and
pays a fee to participate in the program.").
296. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53 (discussing new liquidity facilities
created).
297. See generally Marc Labonte, Cong. Research Serv., RL30354, Monetary Policy
and the Federal Reserve: Current Policy and Issues for Congress (2015) (providing
detailed overview of Fed's monetary policy before and after Crisis).
298. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 temporarily increased the
insured deposit level to $250,000, the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
extended the temporary increase, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act permanently raised the cap to $250,000. See Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 § 136(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5241(a)(1) (2012); Helping Families
Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204, 123 Stat. 1632, 1648-51
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 5241); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) (amending 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1821 (a)(1) (E), 1787(k) (5)); see also Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC
Insurance Coverage Permanently Increased to $250,000 per Depositor (July 21, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/prIO161.html [http://perma.cc/ZE8S-
UK8W] (noting increase in deposit insurance coverage limits).
299. FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, Debt Guarantee Program and
Transaction Account Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. § 370.3-370.4 (2014).
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The important role of these and other government interventions in
restoring market functioning and subsequently enabling the markets to
function without such massive government support is reflected in the
Libor-OIS spread, the same measure used throughout the first year of
the Crisis to demonstrate that markets were in a state of significant and
ongoing dysfunction.3 0 0 Figure 1 extends the period covered past the first
year to the full arch of the Crisis, with notations for developments that
appear to have had a particularly sizeable impact on the spread. This
expanded view supports the notion that the fumbling of early efforts to
get EESA adopted and to implement TARP adversely affected market
functioning, but it also sheds light on the government interventions that
were particularly important in restoring market functioning.
Among the government initiatives aimed at restoring market func-
tioning, the Treasury's programs to recapitalize the largest financial
institutions proved particularly critical.3 0 ' Pursuant to its Capital Purchase
Program (CPP), the Treasury Department invested more than $200
billion of the TARP funds in over 700 different financial institutions. 30 2
While the Libor-OIS spread is probably disproportionately affected by
these programs, as banks were the direct beneficiaries, the magnitude of
the effect and the scope of the programs make it clear that one of the
reasons that liquidity support alone had failed to quell the market dys-
function is that financial institutions were too thinly capitalized relative
to the risks to which they were exposed.
Another important development facilitating the ability of the markets
to function without widespread government backstops was the public
disclosure of regulators' assessments of the capacity of the largest banks to
withstand further adverse developments. Through the Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP), 150 examiners and analysts from the Fed,
the OCC, and the FDIC evaluated how the nineteen largest banking
organizations would fare under specified adverse conditions. 3  After
asking banks to "estimate... losses and earnings ... under two alter-
native" scenarios, regulators "identiffied] methodological weaknesses,
missing information, over-optimistic assumptions, and other problems";
"made judgmental adjustments to the firms' loss and revenue estimates";
300. See infra Figure 1.
301. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Capital Purchase Program, http://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-
programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/52GZ-6CEP] (last updated Oct. 16,
2015 12:02 PM) (describing Treasury's Capital Purchase Program).
302. Id.
303. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Bernanke, May 11,
2009 Speech], http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke2009051 Ia.htm
[http://perma.cc/RUE7-85X7] (introducing SCAP).
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and undertook other steps aimed "to achieve methodological consis-
tency" and improve accuracy. °4
As Bernanke explained when the results were released, the "exa-
minations were not tests of solvency," which had long been monitored
and regulated.3 0 5 "Rather, the assessment program was a forward-looking,
'what-if exercise intended to... gauge the extent of the additional capital
buffer necessary to keep these institutions strongly capitalized and lending,
even if the economy performs worse than expected between now and the
end of next year. ' 30 6 A primary aim was to disseminate useful and credible
information about bank health. As Bernanke later explained, the Fed
recognized that "[t] he loss of confidence we have seen in some banking
institutions has arisen not only because market participants expect the
future loss rates on many banking assets to be high, but because they also
perceive the range of uncertainty surrounding estimated loss rates as being
unusually wide" and the SCAP "was designed to reduce this
uncertainty. 307
The decision to disclose the results was controversial, as it runs
against the strong tendency of bank regulators to favor confidentiality
and was questioned by numerous outside commenters. 30 1 It was made
easier by the fact that the government could commit to providing banks
the capital they needed to address identified shortcomings.3 0 9 On net,
304. Id.
305. Press Release, Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Statement Regarding the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 7, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bernankescap20090507.htm
[http://perma.cc/6MLG-HZBY].
306. Id. For more information about the methodology, see generally Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design and
Implementation (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/bcreg2009O424al.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q26L-BGL7].
307. Bernanke, May 11, 2009 Speech, supra note 303.
308. See, e.g., Stavros Peristiani, Donald P. Morgan & Vanessa Savino, The
Information Value of the Stress Test and Bank Opacity 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff
Report No. 460 (July 2010), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/
staff reports/sr460.pdf [http://perma.cc/CW5G-J5Z9] ("The introduction of the stress
test was greeted with a mixture of trepidation and skepticism by financial analysts, with
some worrying that undercapitalized banks would be closed or nationalized based on the
test results, and others expecting a 'white-wash'...."); see also Donna Borak, The
Increasing Leverage of Daniel Tarullo, Am. Banker (July 28, 2013), http://
www.americanbanker.com/magazine/123_8/the-increasing-leverage-of-daniel-tanillo-
1060538-1.html [http://perma.cc/2HK6-TU5G] ("Some on the board feared that the
market would lose confidence in the banks if the results [of the stress test] were
negative.").
309. See Press Release, Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y of the Treasury, Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Sheila Blair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. &John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, The Treasury Capital Assistance
Program and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 6, 2009), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090506a.htm [http://perma.cc/JS4Q-
WZXG] (noting SCAP complemented Treasury's Capital Assistance Program (CAP),
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Fed policymakers seem to have decided that in light of the uncertainty
that remained pervasive in 2009, "[e]ven a mixed bag of information
about the actual condition of banks was better than knowing nothing
and fearing a worst-case scenario."31 The SCAP seemingly succeeded in
reducing uncertainty and promoting market activity.3 I Bernanke opined
later: " [T] he SCAP stands out for me as one of the critical turning points
in the financial crisis. It provided anxious investors with something they
craved: credible information about prospective losses at banks.
31 2
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Essay's recounting of the first year of the Crisis, while
necessarily heavily edited relative to the volumes of primary materials
from which the account is derived, remains closely tethered to those
materials. This Essay's normative claim creates the framework for the
examination, but policymakers' voices are retained throughout. This is
important in part because the account has implications beyond this
Essay's claims regarding how the Fed can best use its LOLR authority.
One valuable lesson from this analysis, for example, is that the Crisis
was in fact underway for more than a year by the time Lehman Brothers
failed. 31 3 While this has been acknowledged by many, it remains poorly
understood by the public and even by some otherwise quite informed
academics and commentators. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for
example, authored an influential law review article and subsequent book
in which they argue that during crises "rational legislators and judges
[have] no real choice but to hand the reins to the executive and hope for
the best."31 4 To support this claim, they give two examples-Congress's
decision to authorize the use of force shortly after the terrorist attacks of
9/11 and Congress's decision to authorize the Treasury to buy troubled
assets shortly after Lehman failed and AIG was bailed out in September
2008.3 15 While acknowledging differences between the events, their
analysis equates the failure of Lehman in September 2008 with the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 2001 and suggests that while
"which makes capital available to financial institutions as a bridge to private capital in the
future").
310. Borak, supra note 308 (describing Tarullo's rationale for pushing for disclosure).
311. E.g., Peristiani, Morgan & Savino, supra note 308, at 4-11.
312. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Stress
Testing Banks: What Have We Learned? (Apr. 8, 2013), http://federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/speech/bernanke20130408a.htm#f2 [http://perma.cc/TR7C-SKC3].
313. See, e.g., supra section III.D.1 (describing events precipitating failure of Lehman
Brothers).
314. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1613, 1614 (2009)
[hereinafter, Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance]; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2011).
315. Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance, supra note 314, at 1613-14.
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in each case, there may have been earlier signs of trouble, the problems
were too amorphous prior to that time for regulators to have been able
to prod Congress into action. 316 The examination here of the thirteen
months leading up to September 2008 tells a very different story, one
with important implications for the balance of power among the govern-
ment actors involved.
If September 2008 had come out of the blue, then, consistent with
Vermeule and Posner's account, effective crisis governance may well have
required that the executive branch take the lead and obtain excep-
tionally broad discretion from Congress about how best to proceed.
Recognizing that the Crisis had been going on for more than a year prior
to the disastrous events of September 2008 raises questions about
whether the Fed and other financial regulators should have sought
greater authority from Congress earlier and if expectations that they
would be granted more authority with fewer strings attached might have
been among their reasons for -not doing so. There are also questions
about what Fed and other policymakers communicated to members of
Congress about their intentions when they sought approval for EESA.
For example, Bernanke's recently released autobiography reveals that he
believed that injecting capital into banks was likely to be more effective
than Paulson's plan to try to buy troubled assets from banks and that
Paulson had "assured [Bernanke] that the authority to purchase assets
would be written broadly enough to allow the government to purchase
equity shares in banks-that is, to inject government capital, [Bernanke's]
preferred approach-if that turned out to be best. ' 317 Only by closely
examining the full year leading up to the passage of EESA and what
policymakers knew during this period can we develop a more robust
understanding of the degree to which the Fed and other regulators
shared critical information with Congress, whether they may have
withheld information, and the implications of those decisions.
More generally, the widespread tendency to talk about the "2008
financial crisis" elides a critical period in that crisis, one that merits far
greater attention than it has received in the ongoing efforts to learn all of
the lessons the Crisis has to teach. In providing a detailed account of
what Fed policymakers knew and believed at keyjunctures in this period,
this Essay lays the groundwork for these efforts to continue in a more
informed and thus productive way. The remainder of this Essay leaves
further examination to future work and focuses instead on the implica-
tions of this account for this Essay's normative claims.
316. Id. at 1638-39.
317. Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath 304
(2015).
912 [Vol. 116:843
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
A. Better Outcomes Were Possible
If the scale of the Crisis was fixed as of its start in August 2007, then
the claim here is moot. By contrast, if the alternative decisions that the
Fed might have made following the proposed approach would have
altered the course of the Crisis, this would provide strong support for this
Essay's claims. Unfortunately, we will never know with certainty either
way. It is impossible to press rewind and see what would have happened
under various alternative scenarios, and trying to assess what might have
been is an inherently speculative undertaking and one inevitably biased
by hindsight. Nonetheless, this is the type of enterprise that has been
employed repeatedly and productively in the wake of financial crises
throughout history and is how we learn from them.
This Part grapples with these challenges by focusing on the core
issue of how a central bank that recognized the difference between finite
and persistent liquidity crises-and the unique challenges and oppor-
tunities posed by the latter-may have responded differently given what
Fed officials knew and believed at the relevant junctures. It further
assumes that altering the paradigm for how a LOLR ought to respond
during periods of prolonged distress will alter the types of questions
Congress, academics, and others will pose to Fed officials when seeking
to hold them accountable for their actions. This latter layer is key, as it is
the mechanism for both addressing concerns about legitimacy and
reducing the capacity for Fed officials to dodge responsibility when they
were in a position to take productive actions by utilizing their powers in
the ways proposed. Again, the analysis is necessarily truncated in light of
space constraints, addressing only a few of the virtually endless alter-
native scenarios.
1. The Early Stages. - There are a number of ways that the Fed may
have more effectively used its LOLR and other sources of authority during
the first seven months of the Crisis had it viewed itself as having the right
and obligation to function as an information-coordination agent once it
was clear the financial system was facing a persistent liquidity shortage. For
example, Fed officials were aware that a significant factor contributing to
the hesitance of financial institutions to work with one another was a lack
of information about the distribution of subprime exposures."' Fed
officials were also aware that they lacked a complete understanding of
these dynamics. 19 Given the Fed's willingness to cut the Fed funds rate
twice in January 2008 and the fact the Fed had already put the TAF in
place, a Fed attuned to the importance of information gaps might have
also opted around that time to create a liquidity facility designed to
provide financial institutions access to relatively cheap liquidity in
exchange for (1) information about that institution's direct and indirect
exposures to subprime assets, (2) the tools the institution was using to
318. See supra sections II.A-III.B.
319. See supra sections III.A-III.B.
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assess the value and risks of the assets, and (3) any efforts it had taken to
mitigate these exposures. Such intervention would have had a far smaller
downside risk than the rate cuts and might have yielded an array of
benefits, including providing both the institutions and the Fed much
needed information about the nature and dispersion of risk exposures
and variations in the tools being used to assess their value. It also may
well have alerted the Fed to important connections among institutions,
and properly executed, it may well have revealed the extensive one-way
risk AIG had assumed as a result of insuring such exposures.
Another move that the Fed might have taken around January would
have been to focus on the financial health of banks and other financial
institutions. In addition to the other important developments in January,
this was the month that specific findings were presented to the FOMC
regarding the inadequacies in many banks' risk-management systems.12 0
Even at that time, it was well known that capital is a backward-looking
measure and that whether a bank is adequately capitalized depends not
only on the actual downside risks to which a bank is exposed but also the
bank's capacity to identify and measure its risk exposures. 32' Even under
the approaches to bank oversight then in place, the Fed and other
prudential regulators could have used deficient risk-management systems
as a basis for demanding that banks raise fresh capital. 22 Given that the
large banks and investment banks may well have still been able to raise
capital in the market at that stage and that thicker capital cushions at the
largest and least well-managed institutions might have substantially im-
proved the capacity of the financial system, such a move might have signi-
ficantly altered the course of the crisis. In short, even in light of what Fed
officials knew at the time, such a move had far greater upside than down-
side risks. While this type of move is contrary to bank regulators' tradi-
tional predilection toward delay, it is precisely because that predilection is
so well established and so problematic that the Fed should be expected to
take the lead in identifying and prompting a timely response when the
market is signaling that there are reasons for concern.
Although there are numerous other productive actions a Fed
focused on functioning as an information-coordination agent might well
have taken during these very early stages, it is the six months following
the failure of Bear Stearns that is most ripe with missed opportunities.
After seven months of strained liquidity conditions, it was clear that the
markets were experiencing persistent liquidity shortages, and thus a
change in approach would be appropriate under the paradigm proposed
here. Bear's near-failure and the Fed's responses to it altered the course
320. See supra text accompanying notes 174-176.
321. See, e.g., Richard S. Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 317, 350 (1993) (observing "[c]apital
is, intrinsically, a lagging indicator of problems").
322. See e.g., id. at 354-59 (exploring Fed's risk-based prerogatives in encouraging
firms to raise capital).
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in ways that are central to the issue of how a LOLR can most effectively
use that authority.
2. Lehman. - Of the countless ways the situation with Lehman may
have played out differently, the analysis here will focus on just three,
overlapping alternatives: (1) forcing Lehman to make difficult decisions
earlier than it did; (2) resolving the Lehman situation without having
Lehman file for bankruptcy; and (3) disseminating credible information
about counterparty exposures and otherwise better handling the resolu-
tion to mitigate the market dysfunction caused by Lehman's bankruptcy.
3 23
One of the principal benefits of having the Fed use its authority to
gather additional information is that it may well have figured out well
before September 2008 that Lehman's assets were worth less than they
purported them to be, that Lehman was disseminating deceptive infor-
mation about its liquidity reserves, and that Lehman would likely not
survive as a stand-alone firm, at least not without a significant capital
infusion. Lehman was losing money, and assuming fresh risks, during
much of the period in question. Other banks similarly faced deterio-
rating health and increasing reliance on ever shorter-term sources of
financing during this period, increasing the fragility of the overall
system. 32 4 Pushing up resolution of Lehman's situation may well have
resulted in Lehman being acquired by Barclays or another financial
firm,3 25 and would likely have increased the resiliency of the rest of the
financial system, reducing the ripple effects, if Lehman was nonetheless
forced to file for bankruptcy.
Apart from the timing of the resolution, a better informed Fed may
well have been able to do more to avert the difficult decision of whether
to bail out Lehman altogether. For example, even with the regulatory
regime then in place, the Fed could have used insights it gained regar-
ding Lehman's precarious financial health to explain to the SEC why it
should use its supervisory authority to encourage Lehman to raise capital
and otherwise improve its financial health. The Fed also could have
signaled to Lehman that ongoing access to the Fed's two credit facilities,
which appear to have played a critical role in the willingness of Lehman's
counterparties to continue working with the firm, would be conditioned
on the firm selling some of its illiquid assets and raising fresh capital. In
light of the evidence that Lehman's CEO, Richard Fuld, failed to pursue
other options in part because of expectations that government support
would be available if needed, signals to the contrary may have altered his
assessment of a range of options, increasing his willingness to raise
323. Further courses of actions that could have affected both Lehman and AIG are
discussed further below. See infra section IV.A.I.b.
324. E.g., Gorton, Metrick & Xie, supra note 72, at 1.
325. See Anne Craig et al., The Weekend that Wall Street Died, Wall St. J. (Dec. 29,
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123051066413538349 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing Barclay's interest in Lehman and how Fed's failure to
communicate with UK counterparts in timely fashion foreclosed that option).
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capital on terms he may not have found otherwise desirable or to initiate
discussions of a possible merger.
A distinct way the Lehman situation would likely have played out quite
differently had the Fed been playing the role of information-coordination
agent is that, even holding all else constant, the Fed might have been able
to mitigate the ripple effects emanating from Lehman's failure. A study by
the FDIC suggests that had Lehman's resolution been conducted under
the FDIC's control rather than through bankruptcy, the value destroyed
would have been a small fraction of the overall value destroyed by its
bankruptcy. 326 Even without the changes wrought by the Dodd-Frank Act,
the report explains a number of ways that, had the overall process been
handled in a more coordinated fashion, much of the value destruction
could have been avoided.3 27 A more informed Fed might also have been
able to reduce the ramifications of Lehman's failure by reducing the
effective uncertainty that it triggered. Throughout the Crisis, intercon-
nections among financial institutions played a key role in magnifying
distress, and the Fed explicitly recognized the importance of such inter-
connections in explaining the assistance it provided to Bear Stearns. Had
the Fed gathered reliable information about other banks' exposures to
Lehman and the protection they had in place, the Fed could have
publicized this information when Lehman ultimately failed. Given the
prominent role that lack of information about other banks' exposures to
Lehman played in helping to explain the magnitude of the fallout, this
type of information may have meaningfully reduced the market dysfunc-
tion that followed.3 2 8 In sum, there is a reasonable basis for thinking that
the Lehman failure may have been averted or its effects reduced
substantially had the Fed been using its LOLR authority in the manner
here proposed. 329
3. AG. - In order to understand how the proposed approach
would have increased the probability of a favorable outcome with respect
326. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q. 1, 18 (2011), http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/analytical/quarterly/201 1 vol5_2/lehman.pdf [http://perma.cc/G7UX-9K3S]
("FDIC could have used its power as receiver and the ability to facilitate a sale.., to preserve
the institution's franchise value .... ).
327. Id. at 11-18 (discussing methods FDIC could have used to gain information
necessary for effective resolution without signaling to markets that Lehman's failure was
imminent).
328. Cf. Caballero & Simsek, supra note 202, at 4 (suggesting market participants
lacking information about complexity of interconnections between counterparties are
likely to engage in liquidity hoarding to offset uncertainty regarding their exposure to
surprise liquidity shocks).
329. Perhaps the most obvious way that a more informed Fed might have acted
differently would have been to choose to save Lehman. While the leading financial
regulators have all adhered to the position that they had no choice but to allow Lehman to
fail, this claim remains highly contested and even they do not deny they could have helped
Lehman had the firm been solvent, as it may well have been earlier in the summer.
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to AIG, it is critical to evaluate what happened and what could have
happened in probabilistic terms. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear
that, contingent upon there being no other changes in the period
leading up to September 16, 2008, providing MG the liquidity it needed
to continue operations was likely the correct action for the Fed to take.
That said, the correctness of that decision was in no small part a matter
of luck.
As an initial matter, AIG was facing potential downgrades in its
credit rating for reasons quite apart from Lehman's bankruptcy.3 ° It is
entirely possible that AIG would have faced those downgrades, and the
accompanying demands for collateral from counterparties that ultimately
crippled and nearly destroyed the firm, before Lehman's demise. And, it
is far from clear that had AIG run out of liquidity first, policymakers
would have been willing to provide it the requested aid. At least part of
the reason that Fed and other policymakers allowed Lehman to fail was
that they were concerned about moral hazard and they underestimated
the ramifications of allowing it to fail."' In light of how little they knew,
they could easily have made similar miscalculations with respect to MG if
they did not have the additional and game-changing data point of the
market's reaction to Lehman's bankruptcy. Moreover, while with the
benefit of hindsight, we know that AIG was highly interconnected with
other financial institutions and nonfinancial firms and the uncertainty
and other ripple effects of allowing it to fail may well have dwarfed the
effects of Lehman's bankruptcy. Nonetheless, at the time, policymakers
knew little about MG and its interconnections and these other con-
siderations, significantly hampering their capacity to make informed
judgments about the ramifications of alternative courses of actions they
may well have pursued.
Another critical consideration when assessing the bailout of MG in
probabilistic terms is solvency. At the time the Fed initially made
available to MG an $85 billion credit facility, Fed officials had quite
limited information about the firm's financial health and did not actually
330. Defendants' Proposed Findings of Facts at 2-3, Starr Int'l Co. v. United States,
121 Fed. Cl. 428 (Feb. 9, 2015) (No. 11-00779C).
331. See, e.g., See, e.g., Posner, Failure of Capitalism, supra note 133, at 133, 274-75
(suggesting Bernanke and Paulson "let" Lehman fail because of failure to appreciate
consequences and that they could have chosen otherwise); The Price of Failure, Economist
(Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12342689 [http://perma.cc/SQL9-
V7VW] ("Had officials foreseen this debacle, Lehman would surely have been propped
up."); Deborah Solomon et al., Ultimatum by Paulson Sparked Frantic End, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122143670579134187 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (noting "by taking the rescue option off the table," federal
government "re-established 'moral hazard"'); see also Simon Johnson & James Kwak,
Lehman Brothers and the Persistence of Moral Hazard, Wash. Post (Sept. 15, 2009, 8:33 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/
AR2009091500943.html [http://perma.cc/9SXA-UC76] (suggesting Paulson, Bernanke,
and Geithner let Lehman fail "to send a message," but "plan backfired completely").
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know whether it was solvent.3 2 The government itself has highlighted its
"prior unfamiliarity with AIG," in a lawsuit challenging the terms of the
bailout.33 3 While the government got lucky, that fact doesn't change that
the minimal information the government possessed increased the credit
and other risks the government assumed when it authorized the initial
facility to support AIG.
It is also possible that had the Fed gathered more information about
AIG's one-way bet on subprime and other MBS, it could have worked
with AIG and its regulators to do more to address its liquidity manage-
ment and capitalization prior to September 2008. AIG's financial health
suggests it may have been able to raise new capital had it been
compelled, or even strongly encouraged, to do so earlier. 34 Such actions
may have averted the need for it to seek support from the Fed and, even
if the Fed still got involved, these actions would have reduced the credit
risk and moral hazard arising from the intervention.
A significant shortcoming of the government's handling of these
matters, relevant to both Lehman and AIG, is preparedness, or lack
thereof. The events of September 2008 reveal all too clearly that the Fed
and other leading financial policymakers did not have a clear plan of
action for how they would respond in the face of a possible failure of
Lehman or AIG. Fed policymakers knew far less than they could have
about the health of either firm, the value of the assets each held, and the
nature of their connections to other financial institutions. There also
seems to have been remarkably little communication among key policy-
makers about how they would respond to such an eventuality.335 While
nothing can be assured, if the Fed had a better understanding of the
probability that either firm would require liquidity support and the chain
reactions that might occur if they were allowed to fail, or if Fed officials
expected to be held accountable under the paradigm proposed here,
Fed policymakers may well have done more to prepare. In addition to
being helpful for the reasons given, this might have enabled policy-
makers to appear more informed when seeking greater authority from
332. See supra section III.D.2.
333. Defendant's Statement of Contested Facts at 20, Starr Int'l Co., 121 Fed. Cl. 428
(No. 11-00889C).
334. Cf. Plaintiffs' Corrected Proposed Findings of Fact at 16-17, Starr Int'l Co. v.
United States, 121 Fed. CI. 428 (Aug. 22, 2014) (No. 11-00779C) (identifying potential
investors and providing other evidence to support possibility of market-based alternatives
as late as September 2008).
335. For example, in his autobiography, Geithner notes that on the Thursday night
prior to the failure of Lehman, "[W]hen Hank [Paulson] forcefully repeated his no-
public-money stand during a conference call with Ben [Bernanke] and SEC Chairman
Chris Cox, I began to worry that he actually meant it." Geithner, supra note 132, at 179.
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Congress after Lehman failed, which may have independently reduced
the magnitude of the fallout.
336
The final point to highlight is that a more informed Fed could have
sought greater authority to address the challenges it was facing or worked
more closely with regulators who had the powers that the Fed lacked.
The scope of the Fed's authority is not fixed; it can always be expanded
or contracted by Congress.3 3 7 In the wake of Bear's failure, some mem-
bers of Congress seemed open to expanding the Fed's oversight to reach
the investment banks and potentially other systemically important insti-
tutions. Had the Fed used its LOLR authority to learn more about the
interconnections among Lehman and other banks, the amount of one-
way risk AIG had assumed, or other sources of fragility, the Fed may have
sought-and gotten-Congress to act far sooner than it did. This seems
particularly likely given that the competence of the OTS, the SEC, and
state insurance regulators-at least with respect to their oversight of
systemically important financial institutions and their capacity to
understand and address the systemic ramifications of problems at those
institutions-had been revealed to be clearly wanting. The inherent
elasticity of the regulatory authority and the capacity of expert regulators
to play a meaningful role helping Congress to understand the nature of
the challenges that they are facing and the tools needed to address them
are thus highly relevant in assessing how the thirteen months here at
issue may have been better utilized.
B. Liquidity and Information
Financial crises are not all-or-nothing events. Size matters.
Throughout the period here at issue, the country was in the midst of a
financial crisis that it was too late to avert. Nonetheless, the costs that the
Crisis would inflict on the real economy were not a foregone conclusion.
Nor was the amount of moral hazard from expanding the government
safety net and the corresponding need for a large-scale regulatory over-
haul to address it. The analysis here suggests that had the Fed accepted
that it could and should use its LOLR authority in the ways proposed, the
depths that followed might not have been so deep.
More generally, the unfolding of the Crisis detailed here is consistent
with this Essay's claims that persistent liquidity shortages merit distinct
treatment and that information plays a critical role in efforts to address
persistent liquidity shortages. Through actions like changes in the term of
336. E.g., Mishkin, Over the Cliff, supra note 294, at 52-55 (describing process and
identifying it as one of four key developments "that morphed the subprime crisis into a
virulent global financial crisis").
337. See Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance, supra note 314, 1646-60 (discussing
how Congress regularly expands authority during periods of financial crisis); see also
Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal
Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 221, 264-66 (2010) (discussing
narrowing of Fed's lending authority after Crisis).
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its discount window operations, adoption of the TAF, the institution of
two credit facilities to support primary dealers in March 2008, and the
backstop enabling JP Morgan's acquisition of Bear Stearns, the Fed was
actively seeking to pump fresh liquidity into the system throughout the
period here at issue. Those efforts resulted in modest but incomplete
improvements in market functioning. With the benefit of hindsight, it is
clear that those efforts failed to bring about a more lasting restoration of
market functioning because they were symptoms of deeper ills plaguing
the financial system that liquidity alone could not resolve. As reflected in
the market's response to the CPP and Treasury's related programs, one
of the core challenges was that market participants accurately perceived
that many banks and other financial institutions held insufficient capital
in light of the risks to which they were exposed. The market's response to
the stress tests, meanwhile, suggests the way that market participants' lack
of information also contributed to that dysfunction. Looking further
back, the discussions among Fed policymakers throughout the first year
show that both of these were issues to which they were attuned, even if
they failed to fully investigate or address them, well before September
2008.
Further affirming the importance of rethinking how the Fed can
best use its LOLR authority, the case study illustrates the downsides of
the Fed's willingness to provide liquidity during periods of prolonged
market dysfunction. Without the Fed's LOLR interventions, market
participants would very likely have had to make difficult decisions earlier
than they did. Had regulators used the intervening period to develop a
more comprehensive game plan for addressing foreseeable contin-
gencies, or otherwise used the intervening time to bring about changes
that would enhance the capacity of the financial system to withstand
further adverse developments, this delay might have proved quite useful.
As it was, the intervening period was one during which the overall system
became increasingly fragile and regulators became only minimally more
prepared, suggesting that the short-term benefits derived from the Fed's
LOLR interventions ultimately may have done as much harm as good.
The Fed's LOLR authority is a tool; it is not a panacea. The
preceding analysis reveals a number of issues that could not or should
not have been addressed by the Fed using the leverage it enjoys by virtue
of controlling access to liquidity. Nonetheless, it does show how a more
robust use of this tool can function as a critical first step in devising a
more comprehensive response in the face of a budding financial crisis. It
identifies a number of ways that the Fed plausibly could have used its
LOLR authority to become better informed and how Fed policymakers
may have made different-and better-choices, had they done so. It
further suggests some ways that the Fed could have used its LOLR auth-
ority to strategically facilitate the dissemination of information in ways
that may have reduced effective uncertainty and promoted market func-
tioning. The Fed alone cannot bring an end to all financial crises, but by
[Vol. 116:843
LENDER OF LAST RESORT
serving as an information-coordination agent, it can more effectively
fulfill its longstanding role at the forefront of efforts to contain a growing
financial crisis.
V. CHALLENGES
This Part assesses some challenges and drawbacks of having the Fed
use its LOLR authority to pursue aims beyond directly counteracting
liquidity shortages. The potential concerns are myriad, and often different
in kind. As reflected in the ongoing debates about whether the Fed should
enjoy more or less authority to lend to nonbank financial institutions and
even to banks,338 there are a wide range of perspectives on these matters.
The concerns include both issues of accountability-e.g., are there suffi-
cient mechanisms in place to ensure the Fed uses the significant discretion
it enjoys to further congressionally endorsed and popularly acceptable
aims and will the proposed paradigm shift enhance or detract from efforts
to promote accountability-and efficacy--e.g., are the theorized gains
from the proposed paradigm shift ones that can actually be realized in
practice. Rather than trying to categorize or create a hierarchy among
these competing voices, this Essay seeks simply to identify the most
pressing concerns that might argue against the proposed course. In
analyzing these issues and suggesting most can be addressed if the para-
digm shift is appropriately implemented, this Part also provides guidance
regarding how the ideas proposed here could be translated into workable
policies.
A. Friction
Perhaps the biggest risk associated with imposing additional condi-
tions on a bank's ability to access liquidity from the Fed is that doing so
338. See Federal Reserve Reform Act of 2015, H.R. 3189, 114th Cong. § 11 (proposing
restrictions on Fed's special lending powers that would narrow circumstances under which
Fed could lend to nonbank financial firms); Centennial Monetary Commission Act of
2015, H.R. 2912, 114th Cong. § 4 (calling for establishment of new commission to
"evaluate various operational regimes under which the ... [Fed] may conduct monetary
policy"); Examining Federal Reform Proposals: Testimony Before the Monetary Policy &
Trade Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 3-4 (2015) (statement of
Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies Program, Brookings Institution)
(emphasizing importance of Fed's emergency lending powers for nonbanks); id.
(statement of Paul H. Kupiec, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute) (claiming
proposed restrictions on Fed's emergency lending powers for nonbanks help remove
concerns that Fed "could once again legally lend to stop... [a] financial firm from
failing"); see also Requirements for the Fed to Describe Its Strategy: Testimony Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (statement ofJohn B.
Taylor, Stanford University and the Hoover Institution) (advocating for legislation
requiring Fed to provide Congress with clear rule describing its monetary policy); Federal
Reserve Accountability and Reform, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. &
Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 8-10 (2015) (statement of Peter Conti-Brown, Academic
Fellow, Stanford Law School) (attacking bill supported by Taylor).
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would deter borrowing. This could be problematic because liquidity
shortfalls remain an aggravator of systemic distress and concerns about
stigma can depress usage in dramatic and nonlinear ways.
As a preliminary matter, if conditions are imposed in connection with
access rather than usage and firms have little or no discretion about being
in the eligible pool, then the conditions should not affect usage. This is
precisely the approach the Fed used when it put its on-site teams at the
investment banks in connection with the PDCF, proving its viability.
Moreover, even when imposed in connection with use of a Fed facility,
certain conditions may actually encourage use. Imposing a meaningful sol-
vency requirement, which the Fed could verify only by accessing additional
information about an institution's health and risk exposure, might en-
courage solvent banks to borrow as a way of signaling the Fed's faith in
their financial health.33 9 Similarly, the very framing of the LOLR activity
advocated here is quite different than the type of borrowing that has
traditionally given rise to stigma. There is no reason that use of a facility
designed with the express aim of providing exceptionally cheap liquidity to
financial institutions in exchange for the institution providing information
and otherwise helping the Fed to maintain the stability of the overall
system should create any stigma. If anything, like a meaningful solvency
condition, the willingness to be open and work with the Fed may send
positive signals to the market.
Even if some conditions would be costly to comply with, because of
stigma concerns or otherwise, these frictions should be sufficiently modest,
particularly when focusing on aims like information generation. 4 ' In light
of the Fed's capacity to simultaneously employ multiple facilities and other
mechanisms to inject additional liquidity into the market, the potential
frictions that might result from imposing additional conditions are more
likely to be factors influencing when and how the Fed pursues additional
goals, not whether it should.
B. Other Operational Challenges
Another challenge is that the proposed aims are not self-executing.
Many require expertise, in addition to leverage, to implement effectively
and some may face additional procedural challenges.34 These too are
genuine challenges, but also ones that the Fed should have the capacity
to address. With respect to gathering information, for example, the Fed
339. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 20-21 ("Rather than use of the discount window
being tantamount to being given the 'Black Spot', it could instead be a signal that the
central bank was confident that the firm was fundamentally sound.").
340. Cf. id. (emphasizing frictions created by stigma concerns when central banks
lend for purposes of solvency support rather than information gathering).
341. See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 3504, 94 Stat.
2812, 2815 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (2012)) (requiring agencies
to obtain approval from Office of Management and Budget for any "information
collection request").
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could begin by reassigning some of the bank examiners it already
employs to the new institutions or markets. The Fed could also hire new
staff, use outside advisers, or ask eligible banks to second employees with
the appropriate skills to the Fed as a condition of eligibility. All of these
alternatives entail challenges, but the very existence of so many alter-
natives suggests these are challenges that could be overcome. A similar
array of imperfect but viable options likely exists with respect to the other
operational challenges that would inevitably arise in the process of imple-
menting these proposals.
Related to the general operational challenges is the issue of cost.
Seeking to achieve many of the priorities identified here would entail ex-
penditures. Depending on the scale of the program and the use of
outside advisers, these costs could seem significant. Yet, focusing on costs
is more likely to support than undermine this Essay's claim. Most of the
costs that the Fed would incur implementing the proposed approach are
knowable and limited. Hence, even if the Fed errs by gathering infor-
mation that ultimately is not that useful or the situation improves without
further government intervention, the downside is likely to be modest.
This stands in stark contrast to the downside risk associated with other
interventions that the Fed may use. If the Fed is too quick to lower the
fed funds rate, for example, or keeps it too low for too long, possible
effects include inflation and creating conditions that are conducive to
asset bubbles, increasing the likelihood of a future crisis. 4 2 It is precisely
because there are such significant drawbacks to using the tools otherwise
available to the Fed to combat a potential crisis that the more moderate
costs and other drawbacks of the proposed approach weigh so heavily in
favor of its utilization.
C. Bypass the Fed
A related challenge is that banks may respond by seeking
government-backed liquidity from sources other than the Fed. During
the early stages of the Crisis, for example, banks substantially increased
their reliance on loans from the Federal Home Loan Banks as a source of
funding and liquidity.343 Some banks also used the lure of excessively
high rates of interest to retain and attract insured deposits. 3 44 Rather
than suggesting that the Fed should avoid using the types of conditions
contemplated here, however, these dynamics affirm the importance of
policy changes to reduce banks' capacity to use these alternative pro-
342. Richard A. Posner, Afterword to What Caused the Financial Crisis 279, 279-80
(Jeffrey Friedman ed., 2011).
343. Viral V. Acharya et al., How Do Global Banks Scramble for Liquidity? Evidence
from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Freeze of 2007, at 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Staff Rep. No. 623, Dec. 2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/
research/staff reports/sr623.pdf [http://perma.cc/T65X-BJWA].
344. See id. at 6 n.8, 16-18 (finding banks attempted to increase short-term liquidity at
end of 2007 by growing time deposits).
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grams to access government-backed liquidity. 45 Moreover, there are limi-
tations on the extent to which banks can rely on each of these alternative
discount windows, and neither can be used by nonbank financial insti-
tutions, so the Fed retains significant leverage even if they persist
3 16
D. Information Does Not Ensure Action
A distinct challenge is that much of the analysis here presumes that
better information would lead to better action. While generally true,
information does not always lead to understanding, and understanding
does not ensure wise action. A report, prepared at the behest of the New
York Fed, suggests that at least with respect to the Fed's supervisory divi-
sion, there may be reasons for concern. 4 v This is a serious issue and, like
the last one, should be addressed for reasons apart from the issues raised
here. At the same time, the analysis in Part III reveals many Fed policy-
makers recognized the limits of their knowledge, wanted to better under-
stand what was actually going on, and seemed ready to modify their
response accordingly. Additionally, the aim of calling for a change in
paradigm regarding how the Fed should use its LOLR authority is to also
transform the standard against which the Fed's actions will be measured.
Policymakers who anticipate being held accountable if they fail to use
their authority to gather pertinent and available information and to
timely identify threats may well become more diligent in those efforts,
even if they might not otherwise be so disposed.
E. One Tool, Multiple Aims
A final challenge is that the proposal muddies the waters surrounding
the Fed's various instruments and aims. According to the "Tinbergen
principle," policymakers should have at least one independent policy
instrument for each policy objective, and such an approach has real
virtues.3 4 Nonetheless, there has never been such purity in the Fed's
operations 4. 3 9 The Fed has long been tasked with achieving a number of
overlapping policy aims, and it has been given a range of tools to help it
further those aims. In practice, the relationship between those tools and
345. For a fuller critique of the institutional competencies of these liquidity providers
and other reasons such alternative programs should be revised, see Kathryn Judge, Three
Discount Windows, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 795, 837-55 (2014).
346. Id. at 837, 840 (suggesting alternative discount windows are subject to external
constraints which may make them less useful to banks as liquidity shortages persist).
347. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Report on Systemic Risk and Bank Supervision 2
(Aug. 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/
1303305/2009-08-18-frbny-report-on-systemic-risk-and.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (suggesting NY Fed has "a culture that is too risk-averse to respond quickly and
flexibly to new challenges").
348. Jan Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy 37-42 (1952).
349. See supra Part I (noting conflict and overlap among Fed's objectives and
mandates).
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the policy aims it seeks to achieve has never been cleanly delineated, and
there may be benefits to a little fuzziness in this regard.15' Thus, while the
proposal here may muddy the water, it does so in an environment where
the water is already quite muddy and where that may be optimal.
CONCLUSION
Financial crises are inevitable. The amount of damage a crisis inflicts
on the economy, however, can vary dramatically. So, too, can the amount
of moral hazard created by the government's response. This is not a new
insight. A primary reason central banks are empowered to provide
liquidity is the recognition that insufficient liquidity can cause a modest
crisis to explode into something much more serious. Nonetheless, insuf-
ficient liquidity is not the only factor that can aggravate systemic distress,
and the provision of government liquidity uncoupled from an effort to
redress the underlying problems causing liquidity shortages to persist can
increase the fragility of the overall system. Thus, once a financial crisis
takes hold, a central bank should couple efforts to provide liquidity
with efforts to address the underlying problems causing those liquidity
shortages to persist. This means that the central bank should use its
authority to understand how risks are allocated across the financial sys-
tem, the nature of interconnections within that system, and other sources
of fragility. The central bank should then use these insights to help the
market resume functioning without the aid of the central bank. This is
not a project for the central bank alone. When market dysfunction
persists, it is usually a sign that market participants lack critical
information and that the information they have suggests there is too little
loss-bearing capital in relation to how risks are distributed. By using its
LOLR authority, in conjunction with its other sources of authority, to
serve as an information-coordination agent, a central bank can help
spearhead the efforts required to address these deficiencies. In drawing
attention to limitations in current conceptions of the appropriate role of
a LOLR and offering a new paradigm, this Essay contributes to the
ongoing efforts to learn from the Crisis and to enable the Fed and other
central banks to more effectively contain the next financial crisis.
350. See, e.g., Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, Macroprudential Policy-a
Literature Review, 27 J. Econ. Surv. 846, 864 (2013) (recognizing "in practice, the
different policy tools and objectives of monetary, macroprudential and microprudential
policy are interrelated").
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